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CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF THREE KINDS: ON
TEACHING DOMINANCE FEMINISM AND
INTERSECTIONALITY
Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw
I am pleased to be a part of this symposium honoring Catharine MacKinnon's
groundbreaking work as a feminist theorist, legal advocate, and global activist. This
invitation not only presents the opportunity to examine the interface between dominance
theory and intersectionality, but also the occasion to delve further into the vexed
rhetorical politics surrounding feminism and antiracism.
By now the fact that there has been a contested relationship between antiracism
and feminism is almost axiomatic. 1 Yet as with most things that have become matters of
common knowledge, there is a risk that generalizations can metastasize into hardened
conclusions that obscure rather than illuminate important dynamics among people,
theories, and movements.
This interpretive rigidity is often evident whenever I reference MacKinnon's work
favorably in presentations that explore intersectionality and antidiscrimination law.
Listeners often register surprise that MacKinnon would occupy any constructive space in
the conceptual universe of intersectionality. I sometimes push the envelope even further
by suggesting that her controversial essay From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White
Woman Anyway? is among my favorite MacKinnon essays to teach.2
Teaching MacKinnon, particularly What is a White Woman Anyway? is not
1. See generally Michele Barrett & Mary McIntosh, Ethnocentrism and Socialist-Feminist Theory, 20
FEMINIST REV. 23, 24 (1985) ("Black feminist critiques of the work of white women have made two particular

points . . . [o]n the one hand it is argued that black groups are typecast, stereotyped and ghettoized; that the
dominant racist ideologies ... are reproduced rather than challenged in white feminist work. On the other hand
... it is argued that they are invisible and unheard in white feminist work"); Kum-Kum Bhavnani & Margaret
Coulson, Transforming Socialist-Feminism: The Challenge of Racism, 80 FEMINIST REV. 87, 88 (2005)
("[W]hite women cannot avoid the legacy of racism within feminism"); Margaret A. Simons, Racism and
Feminism: A Schism in the Sisterhood, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 384 (1979) (critiquing important, classic feminist
works by exploring ethnocentrism, racism, and minority women's invisibility). For discussion of the contested
relationship between antiracism and feminism within the law, see, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Barbara Johnson, The Postmodern in
Feminism, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1076 (1992); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and
Theory: A Reply to CatharineMacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217 (1993); Alisa D. Nave, Book Received
(reviewing FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER (Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs,
eds., 2003)), 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 313 (2004); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference
Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and CriticalRace Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296
(1991); Jane Wong, The Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Debate in Feminists Legal Theory: The Debate and
Beyond, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273 (1999).
2. Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practiceto Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 13 (1991).
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without its challenges. For some of my students, many of them progressive young
women and men who gravitate toward courses such as Intersectionalities and Advanced
Constitutional Law, our discussion of MacKinnon's argument profoundly disrupts their
expectations. This dissonance is not incomprehensible given that many students step into
the discussion fully armed with the well-rehearsed critique that feminism has been built
on the erasure of women of color. Moreover, MacKinnon's rhetorical stance and bold
confrontation of the racial politics embedded in this debate pose a striking contrast to
some white feminists who engage the critique through superficial gestures of inclusion,
or who ignore the argument altogether. MacKinnon's unswerving defense of her project
makes her stand out as the purveyor of a universalizing, one-size-fits-all feminism that
runs roughshod over women of color. Staged as such, for a significant number of these
students, my work and MacKinnon's are poised as oppositional rather than synergistic. 3
Intersectionality is one of many registers through which women of color boldly speak
back against their theoretical marginality.
Debates about race and representation in MacKinnon's work have raged for years;
some of these arguments are complex, linked to broader tensions between various
schools of thought on questions pertaining to theory, epistemology, discipline, and
politics. 4 Drawing from debates and reactions of students over the past several years,
there is a sizable cohort who style their critiques as anti-essentialist, yet whose basic
moves are themselves built on essentialisms, including the trope of the white woman. 5
Within, or perhaps under cover of these larger debates are assertions and interpretive
alliances that suggest that, at least for some, what is at stake is less about fidelity to
antiessentialism per se, but more about identity-based politics that reflect very different

3. Of the works that draw a link between the writings of this Author and MacKinnon, many posit
intersectionality as a "remedy" of sorts for the essentialist faults of dominance theory. See, e.g., Kathryn
Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2479 (1994); Rosemary Hunter,
Deconstructingthe Subjects of Feminism: The Essentialism Debate in Feminist Theory and Practice, 6 Austl.

Feminist L.J. 135 (1996); Wong, supra note 1. This interpretation is not, of course, groundless. I have been
and remain a critic of theories and practices that fail to sufficiently account for and effectively engage the
interface between gender and other systems of subordination. My own projects have tended to take up
relatively specific articulations of feminist and antiracist interventions with the goal of interrogating how
narrow conceptualizations of race and gender power produce limited and sometimes counterproductive
political rhetorics and policy interventions. While these sites of feminist and antiracist convergence are the
points of departure for my own work, intersectionality is certainly not limited to these concerns. Equally
significant is the possible reading of intersectionality as either a call for a Black feminist particularity, or as
simple illustrative of the incoherence of feminism per se. I find neither interpretation compelling, nor have I
tended to frame my principle critiques in the language of "anti-essentialism." See, e.g. Mapping the Margins,
pp. (arguing, for example, in the case of the competing race/gender narratives on the Anita Hill debacle, that
the centrality of Black male and white female experiences, respectively, could not be met solely by invoking a
sense of the "multiplicity of identities" nor through a challenge seeking to "out" the essentialism in race and
gender claims more generally. Instead, I called there - as I do here - for a more robust analysis of how
difference make a difference in marginalizing and sometimes erasing the consequences of a race-gender system
for women of color.
4. See sources cited supra note 1.
5. See discussion infra at p. 142.
6. Because the deployment of essentialism as a critique serves multiple and sometime contradictory
purposes, it is not always clear from its deployment what its sins really are. Compare DEBORAH L. RHODE,
JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 83-84 (1989) (leveling the essentialist critique at

MacKinnon, arguing that MacKinnon's dominance theory relies on a biologically essentialist framework while
"ignor[ing] the ways that common biological constraints are experienced differently by different groups of
women") and DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION AND
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orientations toward feminism and antiracism.
This presumption of oppositionality between white feminists and feminists of color
is markedly different from the presumptions that prevail when feminists of color are
situated in relation to race-based discourses. Feminists of color are not usually presumed
to be in active contestation with leading antiracist theorists7 even though many antiracist
THE LAW 120 (1991) (leveling a different essentialist critique at MacKinnon, arguing that MacKinnon's
essentialized "woman" relies entirely too much on a "social reality" constructed through the male gaze and
male power.) To hazard a working framework for this discussion, essentialism captures the view that members
of a particular group all possess some set of defining characteristics, universal among group members, and not
dependent upon context. Under the essentialist framework, although individual group members may possess
characteristics that are not in the bundle of characteristics required for group membership there is nevertheless
some bottom line "essence" of experience that is shared amongst all group members. Thus, an argument that
there is an identifiable "woman's" or "Black person's" experience that maintains a stable and clear meaning
across different historical, social, and personal contexts would be subject to critique as essentialist. See, e.g.
Harris, supra note 1, at 585 (1990) (describing how MacKinnon's work relies on "gender essentialism" insofar
as it holds that a "unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience"). The antiessentialist critique would be premised on
the impossibility of reducing the experiences of particular groups down to an essential narrative shared by all
members. See, e.g. Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's
House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 19 (1995) (arguing against the possibility of a universal "women's
experience" on the basis that "race and class can never be just "subtracted" because they are in ways
inextricable from gender"). Antiessentialist arguments vary in terms of what kinds of claims are grouped
together as essentialist; for some, any asserted commonality across group members, or the very attempt to
name a group is essentialist while for others, an acknowledgment that group members will be shaped by
particular contexts and the interplay of myriad identities in individual group members would likely escape the
essentialist critique. When and to whom the label "essentialist" is attached is another variable in the discourse
and is the point of departure of this Article. The background premise of this discussion is that the critique is
somewhat selectively deployed, first as against so-called "identity" formations such as "women" and "Blacks,"
as opposed to class-formations such as "the working class" or "the poor." Further, within and between the
discourses of antiracism and feminism, the critique is more likely to surface within the latter than the former.
7. In contrast to the presumption that feminists of color are in active contestation with mainstream
feminists, see sources cited supra, note 1, many feminists of color, including this Author, Mari Matsuda,
Angela P. Harris, and Patricia Williams, are widely cited as aligned with Critical Race Theory ("CRT"), not as
contesting CRT claims. Compare Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural
Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 78 (1994) (noting the "split that exists between white feminists
and feminists of color"), with UMKC Law Review, New Complexity Theories: from TheoreticalInnovation to
DoctrinalReform, 71 UMKCLR 431, 432 (2002) (referring to Angela Harris, Mari Matsuda, and this Author as
"critical race feminists"). It bears noting, however, that this observation about the tendency to see feminists of
color in oppositionalist terms regarding feminism, and cooperative terms regarding antiracism, reflects
differences in degree and is also field specific. Within the political and cultural discourses around the political
allegiances of Black feminists, for example, there are significant allegations that such sensibilities are at odds
with Black community interests. In the political arena, such allegations shaped the controversy over Anita Hill,
whose testimony against Clarence Thomas was roundly criticized within the Black community as a treasonous
saddling up to white feminists even though Hill did not frame her testimony at that time in feminist terms. See,
e.g. Jane Mansbridge & Katherine Tate, Race Trumps Gender: The Thomas Nomination in the Black
Community, 25 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 488, 488-89 (1992) (arguing that Blacks were "concem[ed] at this
historical moment with the public image of a Black woman attacking a Black man."); Kimberl6 Crenshaw,
Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriationsof Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, ENGENDERING POWER 402, 416-20 (Toni Morrison, ed., 1992) (arguing that the "vilification of Anita Hill"

emphasized how she treacherously violated the 'code of silence' . . . experienced by African-American [intraracial rape victims] as a self-imposed gesture of racial solidarity") (citing Nathan Hare & Julia Hare, The Many
Faces of Anita Faye Hill, FINAL CALL (Nov. 18, 1991) at 29). In the cultural arena, author Alice Walter was
widely attacked on similar grounds of similar critiques of treason and betrayal for her novel THE COLOR
PURPLE, which was widely critiqued as a tirade against Black men. See, e.g. Henry Louis Gates, The Black
Person in Art: How Should S/He Be Portrayed? (Part II), 21 BLACK AM. LITERATURE F. 317, 318 (1987)
(noting that critics view "Walker as a prostitute . .. (for] exploit[ing] the . . . schism between black men and

black women . . . .' in her book) (quoting Eugenia Collier); Jacqueline Bobo, The Color Purple: Black Women
as Cultural Readers, in THE BLACK STUDIES READER (Jacqueline Bobo et al. eds 2004) (noting that some
Black commentators have "called The Color Purple 'the most racist depiction of Black men since The Birth of
a Nation'. . . (and] a Nazi conspiracy') (internal citations omitted); Jacqueline Bobo, Sifting through the
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theorists and activists often frame their theoretical projects in the same universal terms8
that have engendered essentialist critiques of feminists.9 Deeper still is the fact that
despite the centrality of male histories, sensibilities, and urgencies in both historical and
contemporary antiracism, this construction of antiracism around male subjectivities
carries little of the rhetorical sanction that has bedeviled feminism. This is particularly
relevant in current policy discourses operating under the rubric of "Black male
endangerment," where a male-centered analysis circulates as a common, if not dominant,
frame for addressing the disparities that continue to plague the African American
community. 10 Although these frames and the interventions they engender share many of
the features of essentialism against which critics have railed in feminism, this malecentered vision of antiracism has largely escaped the critical scrutiny that is directed
against MacKinnon's feminism. 11
Controversy: Reading The Color Purple 39 CALLALOO 332,338 (1989) (illustrating how Black men attacked
Walker by claiming that she "'had problems with black men ' . . . [and violated] a tradition that is nearly as old
as Black American literature itself . . . [of] 'expos[ing] aspects of [Black] inner-community life that might
reinforce damaging racial stereotypes' . . .). More recently, the heated debates about misogyny in hip-hop have
generated similar allegations against feminist critics, who are accused of carrying white women's sensibilities
into Black cultural spaces. See, e.g. Leslie Weisstuch, Sexism in Rap Sparks Black Magazine to Say, 'Enough!',
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (Jan. 12, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0112/p IsO 1-almp.html (writing
that some critics, such as Professor Todd Body, see Black feminist campaigns against misogyny in hip hop as
"another attempt to lash out at hip-hop's free, and at times, subversive, expression."); Jeffery 0. F. Ogbar,
Slouching Toward Bork: The Culture Wars and Self-Criticism in Hip-Hop Music, 30 J. BLACK STUD. 164, 164183 (arguing that feminist critics of hip hop have ignored the fact that many in the hip-hop community have
risen to critique misogyny and violence in hip hop lyrics and culture). Thus, while it is certainly true that efforts
to discipline Black feminism have been expressed in terms of rhetorical expulsion from the Black community,
this impulse is less prominent in the academic debates, and in legal discourses more particularly. Equally
important is the fact that these politics themselves are manifestations of the principle argument, that the critique
of whiteness in feminism carries considerably more rhetorical weight than the critique of maleness in
antiracism.
8. See, e.g., Frank R. Cooper, Race and Essentialism in Gloria Steinem, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. &
POL'Y 36 (2009); Francisco Valdez, Latinalo Ethnicities, CriticalRace Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in
Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practicesto Possibilities,9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996); Williams, supranote 1.
9. See sources cited supranotes 1, 3.
10. See discussion infra at pp. 123-24.
11. My claim here is not that there are no anti-essentialist critiques of antiracist discourse, but that there is
significantly more space given to such critiques against feminism than antiracism. This may or may not be
empirically provable, and may be limited to the discursive communities within which these tendencies are
observed. Given these caveats, a few observations may suffice to establish the plausibility of the claim. In
1995, Louis Farrakhan staged a Million Man March in Washington, D.C. to which women were discouraged
from attending. See Norma Quarles, Behind Million Men, Black Women: 'No Girls Allowed' Request Leaves
Community Divided, CNN.CoM (Oct. 16, 1995, 10am EDT), http://www.cnn.com/US/9510/megamarch/1016/women/index.html; Million Man March Is Stirring Passions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, available at
Although
http://www.nytimes.coml1995/10/08/us/million-man-march-is-stirring-passions.html?src-pm.
Farrakhan's Nation of Islam is not a sizeable political formation in the Black community, notable African
Americans supported and attended the March including Jesse Jackson, Comel West, Michael Eric Dyson, and
numerous others. See Charisse Jones, Thousands Are ExpectedAt Rally Set by Farrakhan,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1996, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/16/nyregion/thousands-are-expected-at-rally-set-byfarrakhan.html?src=pm. Some African Americans (Angela Davis, Paula Giddings, Julianne Malvaux, Barbara
Ransby, Luke Charles Harris, Cathy Cohen, Marcia Gillespie, and this Author, among others) protested the
exclusion of women on both substantive and political grounds, yet the critics were in a distinct and embattled
minority. See Michel Marriott, Black Women Are Split Over All-Male March on Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1995, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10
/14/us/black-women-are-split-over-all-male-march-on-washington.html. Farrakhan framed the exclusion of
women as an essential means to the March' principle ends: for Black men to hold themselves accountable for
their failures to their families and their communities. However it is doubtful that a similar march organized by
white women which explicitly excluded nonwhite women in order to hold themselves accountable for their
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This suggests that how and when a certain set of critiques become commonplace
and routinely reproduced is not solely a matter of the substantive availability of the
critique. The relative availability of certain critiques of feminism - in this instance,
essentialism, universalism, and the like - alongside the relative absence of similar
claims that could well be launched against antiracism, suggests that a variety of factors
are likely at play that have more to do with politics than an organic commitment to
theoretical rigor. These politics elevate certain oppositions within feminism while they
suppress potential conflicts over the role of gender, sexuality and other differences
within antiracism.
The time may be ripe to interrogate and potentially disrupt these circuits of
meaning, to reconnect links that have been broken, and to redirect critical scrutiny to the
various tropes around which expressions of solidarity and rupture have been organized.
My Intersectionalities classroom is, in a sense, a laboratory in which these objectives are
foregrounded. In teaching these materials, I challenge students to think more deeply
about the politics of representation and the narratives that they take for granted and
reproduce in the antisubordination discourses to which they subscribe. Our conversations
attend to the moments in which structural assertions are tolerated and when they are not,
and to the ways that group members permit certain narratives to stand-in for their more
complex realities and the moments in which they don't. Drawing on my dialogue with
students who have inherited a particular set of assumptions about feminism and
antiracism, I want to highlight and interrogate some of the particular understandings
about the relationship between feminism and intersectionality. These reflections should
not be read as an attempt to build a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing struggles
about the utility of grand theory, or the contours of essentialism in theory and in practice.
Although the narrative I tell here touches on these matters, my primary objective at this
juncture is to share another vantage point on MacKinnon's feminism, one that brings
forward some of the parallels and intersections between her project and projects that are
folded under the banner of Critical Race Theory. In particular, I want to take up several
dimensions of what may be missed in the oppositionalist framing of intersectionality and
dominance theory, not only as an effort to uncover important connections between these
approaches, but also to think more concretely about a certain way that intersectionality
has sometimes been mistaken as a call for Black feminist particularism. Reflected in the
opposing images of 'MacKinnon - laying out grand theory' and 'Crenshaw - setting
forth a Black women's particularity' is an underreading of how intersectionality
incorporates one of the central frameworks introduced by MacKinnon: the

failures to women of color would have been seamlessly integrated within feminist politics. It is also doubtful
that leading white feminists would have graced the stage at such an explicitly exclusionary event. It might be
said that the cases are different, and moreover, that white feminists engage in other exclusionary political
projects, including, for instance, pro-abortion marches in which women of color and their sometimes distinct
frames on reproductive freedom are marginalized. Yet there are significant differences between the formal
exclusion of women of color in one, and the functional marginalization of them in the other, that would seem to
reverse the focal point of the essentialist critique even if both would be targeted. It is this asymmetry that draws
my attention here. See Luke Charles Harris, My Two Mothers, America, and the Million Man March, in BLACK
MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 54, 59 (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999)
(discussing the ways in which issues concerning Black women were pushed to the "periphery of the Black
agenda" in the 1995 Million Man March, to keep the focus on heterosexual Black male concerns).
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"sameness/difference" paradox in antidiscrimination law.
The sameness/difference paradox is one of the central thematics in much of
MacKinnon's thinking.12 Her trenchant critique of how equality discourse reinscribes the
logics of domination within its very terms is now a widely understood critique of the
limits of contemporary antidiscrimination law.13 As I discuss below, my
Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex developed this theme in the context of
14
As argued in
a series of cases reflecting Black women's employment claims.
Demarginalizing, Black women were harmed by court decisions that conditioned their
recovery on their sameness to Black men or to white women, as well as by decisions that
saw them as too different to represent those who were routinely permitted to represent
them - namely, Black men and white women. Often, this dimension of
Demarginalizing is itself underread and, along with it, the convergence between
MacKinnon's insights and those that are central elements of intersectionality and Critical
Race Theory more broadly. Indeed, rarely within the literature do the common threads of
dominance theory and intersectionality find articulation, as if the relationship between
the two projects can be summed up in terms of the corner they each occupy in a racially
charged boxing match. Rethinking this contest offers the opportunity to articulate an
alternative frame, one in which the interface between dominance theory and
intersectionality is understood not as intractably oppositional but as setting forth similar
critiques at different levels of abstraction.
Reconnecting the links that have been severed by the race critique of MacKinnon
also provides the opportunity to explore dimensions of her work that have been obscured
15
- specifically her analytic posture toward power more broadly, and law in particular.

12. For works of Catharine A. MacKinnon that discuss sameness and difference see CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 46-50 (2007); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45 (1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 220-26 (1991) [hereinafter TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281

(1991) [hereinafter Reflections on Sex Equality]. Of course MacKinnon is one of the most prolific scholars of
her generation and thus, the analysis here does not engage the wide expanse of MacKinnon's archive. It
attends more narrowly to the interface between MacKinnon's methodological and rhetorical stance toward
gender hierarchy and the Critical Race Theory approach toward racial hierarchy. In drawing out the parallels
and intersections between these projects in the classroom and in this Article, I engage primarily MacKinnon's
"What is a White Woman Anyway?", a text that has circulated both as an illustration of MacKinnon's
essentialism among critics as well MacKinnon's repudiation of that critique.
13. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006); Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARY. L. REv. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment].
14. Kimberl6 [W.] Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection ofRace and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989)
[hereinafterDemarginalizing].
15. This Article might be grouped together with other recovery projects that seek to reintegrate feminist and
antiracism theories, doctrines and histories. See e.g., SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM,

LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011) (arguing that the role of antiracism in general, and in
particular, the theorizing of Black feminists has been a central but unappreciated feature in the development of
legal strategies and conceptualizations of sex discrimination); DANIELLE L. MCGUIRE, AT THE DARK END OF
THE STREET: BLACK WOMEN, RAPE, AND RESISTANCE - A NEW HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
FROM ROSA PARKS TO THE RISE OF BLACK POWER (tracing the antirape origins of the Civil Rights Movement

and noting that "Rosa Parks was a militant race woman, a sharp detective, and an antirape activist long before
she became the patron saint of the bus boycott.").
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MacKinnon's rhetorical posture toward gender power is parallel in many ways to the
orientation of Critical Race Theory toward race.16 In an earlier period, MacKinnon's
radical feminism and Critical Race Theory's radical antiracism might both have been
framed as representing a militant critique of the gender and racial status quo respectively.
Yet, the similarity in their rhetorical postures is, nevertheless, often eclipsed by a frame
that places them in unyielding ideological and political contestation. Radical gender
politics are associated with a white-woman-identified fundamentalism, whereas Radical
racial politics are all too frequently imagined in terms of a male-centered nationalism.
Framed as such, radical feminism and critical antiracism are cast as irreconcilably
oppositional wherein theoretic or political alliance with one project presumes repudiation
of the other. Lost in this frame is the very possibility of a critical antiracism that is also,
and a radical feminism that is also antiracist. This Article aims to recover just such a
possibility.

FIRST ENCOUNTER
I first encountered Catharine MacKinnon as a third-year student at Harvard Law
School when she was invited to give the Francis Biddle Lecture in the Ames
Courtroom.17 Properly appointed to underscore Harvard's sense of its importance in
legal education, the stately surroundings were accented by the crowd's hushed tones as
we entered the hall. Many of us were drawn to the event having heard more about
Catharine MacKinnon than having read her, and were anxious spectators in the dramatic
16. MacKinnon acknowledges as much, noting that "[t]he African American struggle for social equality ...
has provided the deep structure, social resonance, and primary referent for legal equality." Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1289 (1991). Indeed, the structure of
MacKinnon's critique of sex discrimination law tracks many elements of Black Nationalist critiques of liberal
integrationism, especially its focus on bias and discrimination rather than on the institutionalization of social
power. Although critics have largely lumped Nationalist racial critiques together under the liberal frame of
racial chauvinism and the critical frame of essentialist fundamentalism, as Gary Peller argues, there are various
strands of Black nationalist thought that eschew essentialism but insist on that a non-essentialist theorization of
racial power is possible. Peller contrasts what he calls:
[R]acialist approaches 'essentialize' the group's characteristics into a form of
fundamentalism about the group's identity, characteristics that are supposed to exist
outside of the contingencies of history and geography . . . [and the] more critical
nationalist discourses [that] do not try to universalize the characteristics of racial and
other communities, but rather take the common culture that ties a community together as
the contingent result of historical contestation, as something open to future political
transformation.
Gary Peller, History, Identity,Alienation, 43 CONN. L. REv. 1479, 1488. It is possible to map the debate around
MacKinnon's work through a similar grid, contrasting critics who read MacKinnon's bottom-up theorizing as
sex fundamentalism versus those who read her as setting forth an analysis of gender that, like race, is socially
constructed - i.e. that there is no necessary logic underwriting patriarchy, but its imposition through force
nevertheless creates a common cultural ethos among women as a group, that ultimately ties women together
despite varying intersectional identities among group members. See, e.g. Elizabeth Rapaport, Generalizing
Gender: Reason and Essence in the Legal Thought of Catherine Mackinnon, in A MIND OF ONE'S OWN:
FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND OBJECTIVITY 137 (Louise M. Antony & Charlotte Witt eds., 1993)

(defending MacKinnon's treatment of rape against essentialist critiques, writing that "MacKinnon claims only
that along with the particularity of distinctness there is a common experience of rape, common experience of
various forms of coerced sex that the male paradigm of stranger rape obscures"). The division between these
two positions largely comes down to how much weight is to be given to MacKinnon's rejection of cultural,
biological and pre-historical visions of male dominance.
17. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 163.
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encounter that was about to unfold. I was, at the time, a student activist, having
participated in the occupation of the Dean's office and in a range of other activities
protesting the Law School's exclusionary hiring policies. 18 The law school, to put it
mildly, was an ideological war zone at that point, with liberals and the Old Guard staking
out the position that there were very few people of color throughout the nation who were
qualified to teach at Harvard, while the Crits1 9 and other progressive faculty members
supported student efforts to challenge such complacencies. As far as women were
concerned, apparently the handful of white women who were qualified to teach at
Harvard were already there, a point that was reinforced by the faculty's decision to hire
ten white males in the midst of a high-profile controversy regarding its hiring policies. 20
By that point, it was clear not only how the power to exclude was rationalized and
constructed through a particular vision of merit, but that, within the high-profile searches
for women and people of color that the school had performed, women of color had
utterly fallen through the cracks. 2 1
I had not thought much about gender in the law as such, but as a female organizer
in a race-based group, the presumptions, performances, and expectations of malecentered leadership had been made abundantly clear to me. Indeed, the power dynamics
within BLSA and the Third World Coalition were not at all surprising. I had come out of
an undergraduate experience where both the academic and activist dimensions of student
organizing were highly gendered, where gender conflict was often muted in the name of
racial solidarity, and where gender analysis rarely took center stage in either our politics
or our studies. Although I was, at that point, relatively more conversant with a radical
race critique, I was not at all hostile to the possibility of developing a more systemic
critique of gender in light of what I had witnessed and personally experienced.
MacKinnon's argument that day drew from her work with Andrea Dworkin on
pomography.22 I had not thought much at all about pornography, and I cannot recall my
immediate reaction to the substance of the idea. What I do recall most vividly was being
riveted by the tone and the stance of this new voice. To say that MacKinnon was
uncompromising in the presentation of her ideas does not fully capture the dissonance
between what I had expected and what I saw that day. This dissonance was a reflection

18. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Twenty Years of CriticalRace Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward,43
CONN. L. REV. 1253 [hereinafter Twenty Years]; See also DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY:
REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER 42-44 (1994); see generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY

WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xvi- xxvii (Kimberld W. Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, &
Kendall Thomas eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRT READER].
19. "Crits" is the vernacular term for faculty associated with the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, a
loose affiliation of progressive law professors who in general sought to rethink some of the fundamental
presumptions about law and to transform legal education. See CRT READER, supra note 18, at xxv; see also
Abby D. Phillip, Race Sparked HLS Tension, HARV. CRIMSON, June 1, 2008, available at
http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=523668.
20. See Dave Hom, Third World Coalition Renews Supportfor Course Boycott, HARV. L. REC., Sept. 17,
1982, at 1.
21. See Twenty Years, supra note 18; Kimberld Crenshaw, A Foot in the Closing Door, in CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 9 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome M. Culp & Angela P. Harris
eds., 2002) [hereinafter Foot in the Closing Door]; see also Gary Peller, History,Identity, Alienation, 43 CONN.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2011).
22. ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY
FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1988).
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of an a priori set of expectations about how women speaking about women tended to
perform in rarified atmospheres such as these: Animated but not harsh, sharp but
charming, grounded but not too invested. MacKinnon turned these expectations upside
down. She was concrete and polemical, analytical and evocative, rigorously legal, and
unremittingly social. Her performance transcended the traditional antinomies that
stratified legal thought and social action into separate and unequal spheres. As for being
fearlessly concrete, I think few of us in attendance will ever forget the moment that "f-uc-k" echoed around the walls of Ames Hall.
I found MacKinnon's stance to be a compelling parallel to that of Derrick Bell's in
the context of his writings on race and the law. Indeed, her performative sensibilities in
that courtroom symbolized to me exactly what Bell had sought to represent by including
a lithograph of Tommie Smith and John Carlos giving the Black Power salute in the
opening pages of his book Race, Racism, and American Law.23 Their salute at the 1968
Olympics was one of the more controversial moments of the Black Power movement,
one that not only mesmerized me, but also galvanized youth activists and scandalized the
Nation. 24 When I encountered the image again as a law student, I viewed Bell's decision
to use the salute in this context as symbolic gesture that not only reflected a trenchant
critique of the "games" of legal discourse but also reflected a commitment to master and
transcend its traditional boundaries. Bell's stance signaled what he was offering: An
alternative framing of the study of civil rights.
In Race, Racism, and American Law, Bell pitched the objective of civil rights
beyond the constant search for ways to fit meaningful equality interventions within the
limited parameters of liberal legalism. Bell went beyond these conventional projects to
challenge not simply the regulation of race but, even more broadly, law's construction of
racial power. Having been immersed in Bell's work in the context of the Alternative
Course,25 I read MacKinnon's stance with regard to gender power in a similar vein. Both
were offering radical interventions in complementary ways. Both set out to substantively
lay waste to conventional framings. Both dared to break away from analytic traditions
that had cabined demands for equality to require only moderate reform rather than to
transform race and gender power more fundamentally.
I suspect that many readers may find this comparison curious to say the least.
There are those for whom a Black Power paradigm represented by Bell seems utterly
incompatible with radical feminism, especially a feminism articulated by militant white
women like MacKinnon. No doubt some readers might equate radical race paradigms
with simplistic forms of patriarchal nationalism and thus presume that radical feminists

23.

DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (5th ed., 2004).

24. See Richard Lewis, Caught in Time: Black Power Salute, Mexico, 1968, THE TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 8,
2006, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/article664806.ece; Owen Slot, America Finally
Honours Rebels as Clenched Fist Becomes Salute, THE TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/article580095.ece.
25. The "Alternative Course" was a student-organized seminar that featured guest speakers from across the
nation who visited Harvard each week to cover one chapter from Bell's textbook, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW. See BELL, supra note 18. See also CRT READER, supra note 18, at xxi-xxii; Twenty Years,
supra note 18; Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or "A Foot in the Closing
Door," in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 9 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome M.

Culp, & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002) [hereinafter FirstDecade].
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would necessarily steer clear of any intellectual stance so grounded. This sense that race
and gender projects occupy mutually exclusive social universes may explain a certain
tension that is sometimes apparent between the adherents of these two perspectives. Yet
radical sensibilities - the unrelenting focus on power dynamics structured along race or
gender lines - need not be framed as oppositional to one another. Indeed, an affinity for
structural accounts of power along one domain may actually make such critics more
rather than less receptive to similar analytical projects in other domains. For example,
my own take on MacKinnon's work initially was as much informed by my immersion in
the historicized analysis of racial power as it was by my personal exposure to the politics
of gender.26 Indeed, having learned to think in institutional and structural terms about the
everyday features of American racial stratification, MacKinnon's efforts to do the same
with respect to gender seemed perfectly reasonable to me.
The supposed tension between critical projects organized around race and gender
represents less of an inherent conflict between antiracism and feminism than a particular
(and contested) understanding of what each of these projects is thought to entail. I was
thus not at all troubled by MacKinnon's theorizing in a manner that some criticized as
unduly generalized or abstract because I had come from an intellectual tradition that
theorized racial subordination in much the same fashion. This intellectual tradition
supported the view that one could gain valuable insights about racial subordination
without requiring or expecting an exhaustive articulation of how difference and privilege
among and between disadvantaged groups factored into a particular configuration of
power. Indeed, many of the most illuminating projects that contest and transcend the
traditional parameters of 'race relations' scholarship do so from a vantage point that
articulates racial power using a group-based analysis.
A full list of scholarship falling in this category is beyond the scope of this
comment, but one can add, in addition to Bell's groundbreaking work discussed above,
Cheryl Harris's Whiteness as Property,27 George Lipsitz's The Possessive Investment in
Whiteness,28 Charles Mills' The Racial Contract,29 Robin Kelly's Race Rebels: Culture,

26. I was a graduate of the Africana Studies & Research Center at Cornell University, then directed by Dr.
James Turner, a leading figure in Black studies. The Center was one of the flagship centers of the burgeoning
Black studies movement and the source of my familiarity with structural analysis of racial power. See
AFRICANA STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTER, http://arsc.comell.edu (last visited May 30, 2011); see also
Jonathan B. Fenderson & Candace Katungi, "Committed to Institution Building": James Turner and the
Historyof the Africana Studies at Cornell University, an Interview, J. AFR. AM. STUD., Apr. 29, 2011, at 1. For
an account of the Center's formation, with a brief discussion of the Black student take over of Willard Straight
Hall that in part led to the creation of the Center, see The Plight of Black Studies: Field is Still Not Securely
Entrenched on White College Campuses Despite Nearly Five Years of Student Protest, EBONY, Dec. 1973, at
128. Born in controversy, the Center continues to be a focal point of competing conceptions of what its role
should be in higher education. For example, in late 2010 Provost Kent Fuchs announced that the Center, which
had since its founding been autonomous from Cornell's colleges and reported directly to the provost, would be
moved under the College of Arts and Science, and act that many faculty, alumni current students regard as an
effort to reign in the more radical elements of the program. Press Release, Kent Fuchs, Provost, Cornell
University, Statements Regarding the Africana Studies and Research Center's Move to the College of Arts and
at
available
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2010),
2,
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http://www.comellsun.com/node/45163.
27. Cheryl 1. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
28.
29.

GEORGE LIPsITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS (1998).
CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT (1997).
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Politics, and the Black Working Class,30 and Luke Harris and Uma Narayan's
Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity.3 1 These works set forth compelling
analyses of racial power in a variety of contexts. This work teaches volumes about how
racial power is constituted, maintained, and contested across institutional contexts even
though, as a general matter, these projects neither anticipate nor articulate their particular
racial theories through gender, class, sexual orientation, or other cofactors. In fact, these
projects have circulated widely, and they have been read by academics as well as
laypersons alike as setting forth analytically rigorous and politically provocative
theorizations of race.
Although all these projects can be said to have their own set of critics, it is fair to
say that none of them have engendered anything like the chorus of critiques leveled
against MacKinnon's radical feminism. Of course, it is possible to argue that Bell,
Harris, Lipsitz, and others are in fact doing something quite different than MacKinnon.
32
She is often said to have packaged her claims as universal, whereas the race works
cited here are decidedly local and historical. Moreover, MacKinnon is read as advancing
a theory that centers on white women, whereas the race projects referred to above
explicitly center no particular gender or subjectivity. 33 These distinctions, however, are
more argumentative than evidentiary. MacKinnon does acknowledge the contextual
specificity of her arguments and she critiques abstract or top down theorizing more than
some critics acknowledge. 34 Comparatively, many of the canonical texts on race do not

30. ROBIN D. G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS (1996).
31. Luke C. Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging the Myth
of "PreferentialTreatment," in ETHICS INPRACTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY 448 (Hugh Lafollette ed., 3d ed. 2006),
availableat http://aapf.org/libraries/aarl/equalizingopportunity.
32. See, e.g., DONNA J. HARAWAY, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in
the Late Twentieth Century, in SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 159 (1991)

("MacKinnon's radical theory of experience is totalizing in the extreme; it does not so much marginalize as
obliterate the authority of any other women's political speech and action."); Harris, supra note 12 (taking issue
with the idea that there is one common experience shared by all women); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and
Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 137 (1989) (noting that, in drawing a theory of
commonality based on gender, MacKinnon does not pay enough attention to other facets of identity that have
an impact on the experiences of women); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION

AND THE LAW 83-84 (1991) ("On a descriptive level, dominance-oriented paradigms that divide the world
solely along gender lines ignore the ways that common biological constraints are experienced differently by
different groups of women.").
33. There are, however, race projects that explicitly center males. See, e.g., Frantz Fanon, The Fact of
Blackness, in THE MASCULINITIES STUDIES READER (Rachel Adams & David Savran, eds., 2002); PHILLIP
BRIAN HARPER, ARE WE NOT MEN?: MASCULINE ANXIETY AND THE PROBLEM OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN
IDENTITY (1998); RONALD L. JACKSON, SCRIPTING THE BLACK MASCULINE BODY: IDENTITY, DISCOURSE, AND

RACIAL POLITICS IN POPULAR MEDIA (2006). Yet the argument advanced herein is that even this explicit
grounding of male subjectivity draws relatively fewer critiques of essentialism. See discussion infra note 60.
34. For example, MacKinnon has disclaimed top-down theorizing. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points
Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687, 696 (2000) ("Feminism thus does not "assume," it rather
builds, its "women." From women who socially exist. When feminism makes its "women" from the ground up,
out of particularities, from practice, rather than from the top down, out of abstractions and prior theory, the socalled essentialism problem cannot occur."). Some critics do take MacKinnon's methodological claims
seriously but disagree about whether her methods are not still essentialist. Compare Elizabeth Rapaport,
Generalising Gender; Reason and Essence in the Legal Thought of Catherine MacKinnon, in A MIND OF
ONE'S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON & OBJECTIVITY 127, 135-40 (Louise Antony & Charlotte Witt

eds., 1993) (discussing "strong" and "weak" essentialism, and concluding that MacKinnon's "weak
essentialism" is not methodologically vulnerable to fundamental critiques lodged at her by most antiessentialist feminist critics), with Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There Politics After
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even explicitly engage this question - partly because the temporal and contextual focal
point of their analysis is plainly evident. The claim that MacKinnon's subject is white is
also argument - not an illegitimate one, given the fact that even a lack of signification
often defaults to the dominant subjectivity. But for the claim to be more fully vetted,
critics must grapple with MacKinnon's own descriptions of her method in which
commonality isn't presumed or imposed but informed by what women say their
experiences are. Of course, the debate over what is or isn't essentialist, and more
importantly, what is really a stake in making the claim of essentialism could easily
occupy feminist theory for another decade. The more important question for comparative
purposes is why it is that many race discourses that might easily engender parallel
critiques, namely that the subject is essentially male - are seldom targeted even though
the centering of men's experiences as a focal point of racism is fairly common.
I suspect that these divergent patterns of critique are less about essential
differences between race and gender projects themselves and more about a different
sensibility - perhaps even permissiveness - among consumers of race work.
Consumers of race work tend to see the project of theorizing race as a collective
enterprise, one in which the relevant question is not whether the work attends to
variability within any one racial group, but whether the given analysis of racial power
rings true on a group level.
For the most part, consumers of race work apparently accept that racial patterns of
power can be analyzed as such regardless of race's potentially differential effects as it
winds through a web of other structures and attendant power relations. For example, the
historical practice of segregation, or the contemporary practices of racial profiling, is
framed as acceptable markers of group-based harms notwithstanding the fact that there
remain profound differences among group members regarding how these practices affect
them. The fact that some sectors of a population might have suffered more under a
particular racial regime due to cofactors such as class or age or disability has generally
not been seen as evidence that the initial frame of group-based harm is itself problematic.
This is not to say that exclusion or marginality are unknown or unproblematic
within antiracism. To the contrary, as discussed below, there have been and continue to
be articulations of antiracism that are grounded narrowly and thus generate interventions
that are exclusionary, trading on one kind of subordination to advance interventions
against another. However, the point is that exclusion and marginality require operational
analysis - specific inquiries into whether and to what extent a theory authorizes
interventions that do or do not work across difference. This focus on functional realism is
in contrast to inquiries that focus on a certain antiracist idealism, namely, whether theory
operates to essentialize, universalize, or particularize.
What an extended comparison might reveal is the need to recalibrate the relevant
discourses within feminism and antiracism, all with a focus on the question of what

Postmodernism?) 89 MICH. L. REV. 1549,1558 (1991) (arguing that MacKinnon's essentialist tendencies
"reinforce essentialist epistemology of the traditional thinking that it condemns and seeks to dislodge"), and
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 590-601 (arguing
that MacKinnon's gender essentialism is problematic because it makes gender a linear explanation for
oppression to the exclusion of other identities like race).
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difference difference makes in the theories and practices each authorize. For feminism in
general and MacKinnon in particular, debates about essentialism might be more
productively shifted to efficacy. It may be the case that MacKinnon's theories privilege
interventions that simply do not move the needle much for women of color. However,
advancing this argument would require a kind of reasoning that moves from the general
critique to the specific illustrations, i.e. what are the particular ways that the theory
misdirects the practice. In the arena of antiracism, by contrast, more work might be
directed toward interrogating the continued (and potentially growing) centrality of male
subjectivities in the very articulation of antiracism. Thus, the relevant inquiry in both
instances is not so much about essentialism per se, but is instead about the whether the
theorization of race at issue takes gender structures as given and a theorization of gender
that takes racial structures as a given, reinforcing both structures by failing to contest
them.
SECOND ENCOUNTER
My next significant encounter with MacKinnon was four years later. By then I had
moved into legal teaching, having been hired by UCLA. I was delighted but almost sick
with anxiety to be giving a talk alongside MacKinnon at a conference organized by the
University of Chicago's Legal Forum. 35 At the time I was presenting a talk that explored
the interface between race and gender in antidiscrimination law and social justice
politics. My piece in some sense was a natural progression from my law school interests
in Critical Legal Theory in particular and in race and gender discourses more generally. I
was by that time an active participant in Critical Legal Studies (CLS), having forged
connections with a variety of allies during the student protests over affirmative action.
CLS had been a site of active engagement over the politics of law, and the 1980s, had
witnessed the rise of feminism within that space soon to be followed by the formal
emergence of Critical Race Theory.36 My work was patterned in many ways on what I
had witnessed during the early days as a student activist and budding academic: CLS
intellectual traditions were both critical of prevailing structures of legal consciousness
and, at the same time, interventionist on a variety of discursive levels. 37 Doctrinal
innovation and mass scale social transformation were equally at home within the
movement, and often within the articles themselves. The intellectual tools were drawn
from a variety of theoretical traditions and our politics ranged from Democratic Party
liberal to a variety of left wing affiliations. My own work in this milieu was centrally
organized around doctrinal retrenchment in anti-discrimination law and its implications
35. See Demarginalizing,supra note 14.
36. See CRT READER, supra note 18, at xiii-xxxii.
37. Id. at xix-xxvii. See also Kimberl6 Crenshaw, "Post-Script," in FRAMING INTERSECTIONALITY:
DEBATES ON A MULTI-FACETED CONCEPT IN GENDER STUDIES 221-225 (Helma Lutz, Maria Teresa Herrera

Vivar, Linda Supik eds., 2011 (describing "intersectionality" as arising out of and an attempt to speak across
and within the intellectual and political arena of CLS, a "richly diverse but highly contested space occupied by
left-leaning law professors, debates among and between adherents of various intellectual traditions in all their
classical, post and neo-articulations were standard fare. CLS was a site where liberal feminists struggled and
aligned with post-modernists and dominance feminists, where neo-marxists and post-structuralists struggled
between them and against liberal anti-racists, where liberal anti-racists took issue with radical black
nationalists, who in turn struggled with queer and feminist anti-racists").
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for thinking about racial power. The rhetorical and doctrinal gaps between gender and
race based interventions were embedded in this. The talk I was scheduled to give with
MacKinnon would be one of the first occasions that I would present "intersectionality" to
the broader academic community.
I began this work with the aim of exploring how American courts analyze claims
that involve the simultaneous operation of race and gender discrimination. In short order,
I came across several cases that presented what initially appeared to be a paradox.38 In
one case, it appeared that Black female plaintiffs were getting the silent treatment - that
is, their claims were being processed through an analytic prism that seemed to require
them to slip quietly in the door under the cover of others. As long as Black women could
map their stories onto narratives of Black male or, alternatively, white female
discrimination, they would be treated 'the same' as their group representatives. 39 Yet
where their experiences were different - where prevailing understandings of race or
gender discrimination were not capacious enough to include the combined effects of both
forms of discrimination - their claims were seen as too different to merit consideration.
In one case, the plaintiffs' solution to this imposition was to argue for the right to
combine two causes of action - namely, to set forth a claim of compound
discrimination - yet the court framed this as a request for preferential treatment.
Invoking the metaphor of Pandora 's Box, the court rationalized curbing such claims for
fear that too much difference would create havoc in the operation of antidiscrimination
law. 40

Much of how Demarginalizing has subsequently traveled reflects the perception
that the solution that the Article was arguing for in response to DeGraffenreid was to
create a separate room for Black women, specifically, their own cause of action. Yet this
part of the Demarginalizing analysis, standing alone, has sometimes grounded an
interpretation that is at odds with a parallel point that was being made, namely, that
Black women were harmed not only when they were forced into sameness, but also when
their difference was interpreted as reflecting an experience so different from Black men
and white women that they were rendered categorically distinct from them. It is in the
exploration of this paradox that the analysis lines up with MacKinnon.
The two other cases that are explored in Demarginalizingaddressed Black female
plaintiffs' petitions to represent 'all women' or 'all African Americans' in class actions
against their employers. 4 1 Both claims were rebuffed by courts that saw Black women's
arguments as presenting something outside the scope of standard race and gender
discrimination claims. Indeed, one court put it quite bluntly when it concluded that the
Black female plaintiff was an inappropriate representative of all female employees

38. See Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982), which is discussed at length in Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment, supra note 13, at 141. See also Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475
(9th Cir. 1983); DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd in
part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
39. See Demarginalizing,supra note 14, at 148.
40. The DeGraffenreidcourt stated its discomfort as follows: "[Tjhe prospect of the creation of new classes
of protected minorities, governed only by the mathematical principles of permutation and combination, clearly
raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora's box." DeGraffenreid,413 F. Supp. at 145.
41. Payne, 673 F.2d 798; Moore, 708 F.2d 475.
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because she had not made a claim to discrimination as a female, "but only as a Black
female.'42 This slip of the pen rationale revealed the Court's inability to regard the
intersectional experience of Black women as part and parcel of discrimination as a
woman. 43
The critique of this rationale in Demarginalizing is precisely the opposite what
some infer the piece to be calling for, namely, the separate juridical recognition of Black
women. The point there was that the specific articulation of the Black woman's
experience was no more or less representative of "discrimination as a woman" than the
presumed representative who was white.
What is missing, of course, is an appreciation of the fact that Black women were
harmed both by being treated as though they were the same and by being treated as
though they were different. There was no simple, once and for all, solution because the
nature of the discrimination faced by these Black female plaintiffs was not a simple, once
and for all, event. Indeed, as the cases revealed, there were numerous ways that Black
female plaintiffs experienced discrimination; the point of the intersectional metaphor was
to draw attention to the multiple ways that patterns of power can converge. Its corollary
was to argue both against the elision of difference where it makes a difference, and
against fetishizing difference where it does not. That is, these interactions are dynamic,
historically and contextually specific, and-although they might be prefigured by certain
patterns - they cannot be fully mapped in advance.
The partial erasure of this argument as detailed in Demarginalizing,also occludes
the connections between intersectionality and dominance feminism. Putting these
analyses into conversation with each other, it becomes evident that the analysis in
Demarginalizing is a specific instance of a broader dynamic that MacKinnon had
exposed in her critique of the Aristotelian limits of antidiscrimination law. 44 Addressing
the vexed debate between feminists who embraced an equality paradigm premised on
assertions of the sameness of women to men, to feminists who acknowledged and argued
42. Moore, 708 F.2d at 480 ("Moore had never claimed before the EEOC that she was discriminated
against as a female, but only as a Black female .... This raised serious doubts as to Moore's ability to
adequately represent white female employees.").
43. Similarly, in Payne, Black women were told by the court that they were not claiming discrimination as
women or as Black employees, but only as Black women. Payne, 673 F.2d at 811 ("We are aware of no case
holding that a black female plaintiff is an adequate representative of black males in a sex and race
discrimination suit when the interests of the two groups conflict . . . . Black males are entitled to a class
representative who is free from a desire to prove a claim that will impair their interests.").
44. The Aristotelian conception of equality states that people who are alike should be treated similarly,
whereas those who are unalike should be treated differently. MacKinnon has criticized this view as being
inadequate for remedying the problem of sex discrimination, as women cannot be seen as similarly situated to
men under a system of male dominance. See, e.g., FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 37 ("What is
missing in the difference approach is what Aristotle missed in his empiricist notion that equality means treating
likes alike and unlikes unlike, and nobody has questioned it since. Why should you have to be the same as a
man to get what a man gets simply because he is one?"); see also Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 12, at
1289-91 ("Although the political analysis developed by the civil rights movement was substantive not abstract
. I. and opposed hierarchical disadvantage rather than differentiation as such, courts in racial equality cases
have largely confined themselves to the Aristotelian framework: qualification for admission into liberal
humanity implicitly meant being like the white man .. . . Whatever the defects of the Aristotelian model when
applied to race and nation-and they are substantial-it is stunningly inappropriate to sex. Society defines
women as such according to differences from men: hence the sex difference, as gender is customarily termed.
Then equality law tells women that they are entitled to equal treatment mainly to the degree they are the same
as men.").
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for equality in the name of difference, MacKinnon argued persuasively that sameness
and difference were merely different sides of the same coin.4 5 In both, men are the
measure of whether and to what extent women can gain access to equality. Drawing
attention to the particularity that underwrote equality law, MacKinnon provocatively
inquired: Why must a woman be like a man to get what he has by dint of his birth? 46
And further: Why should women's difference make a difference in what she is able to
wrangle out of antidiscrimination law? 47 MacKinnon's arguments on behalf of all
women are fully applicable in the query posed by Black female plaintiffs, namely: Why
must Black women be like white women or Black men to win the protection that Black
men or white women received under antidiscrimination law? Moreover: Why was it
presumptively legitimate to prohibit a Black female plaintiff from representing all
women simply because her gendered experience also implicated racial disadvantage?
Why would it, nevertheless, be perfectively sensible for a white woman - who
potentially faced no racial disadvantage - to represent nonwhite women, who
presumably did face racial obstacles as well as gender based ones? Why is it that a Black
male plaintiff could represent Black men as well as women, but not the other way
around? In sum: Why does the lack of full congruence defeat the presumption that Black
women can "represent" Black men or white women, yet this same lack of congruence
permits Blacks who are men, or women who are white, to represent Black women?
MacKinnon's arguments in response to the claim that protection against pregnancy
discrimination constituted "special treatment" for women also set forth the contours of a
meaningful response to a similar argument made by the Court in DeGraffenreid. Courts
had rejected arguments that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a
company disability plan or the denial of insurance benefits for pregnancy-related work
losses constituted discrimination, positing instead that such rules were, in fact, gender
neutral.48 As MacKinnon pointedly states:
Gender neutrality suggests, indeed, that it may be sex discrimination to
give women what they need because only women need it. It would
certainly be considered special protection. But it is not, in this
approach, sex discrimination not to give only women what they need,

45. TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 12, at 220-21 ("[T]reating issues of sex equality as issues of
sameness and difference is to take a particular approach. This approach is here termed the sameness/difference
approach because it is obsessed with sex difference. Its main theme is: 'we're the same, we're the same, we're
the same'. Its counterpoint theme . . . goes: 'but we're different, but we're different, but we're different' . . . .
Concealed is the substantive way in which man has become the measure of all things. Under the sameness
rubric, women are measured according to correspondence with man, their equality judged by proximity to his
measure. Under the difference rubric, women are measured according to their lack of correspondence from
man, their womanhood judged by their distance from his measure . . . . Masculinity or maleness is the referent
for both").
46. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 37 ("Why does maleness provide an original entitlement, not
questioned on the basis of its gender, so that it is women-women who want to make a case of unequal
treatment in a world men have made in their image . . . who have to show in effect that they are men in every
relevant respect, unfortunately mistaken for women on the basis of an accident of birth?").
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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because then only women will not get what they need. 49
MacKinnon's observation might be similarly applicable to court decisions that saw
preferential treatment in Black women's demands that doctrine be shaped to recognize
compound discrimination. For example, as I argued in Demarginalizing, the
DeGraffenreid Court denied plaintiffs' demand to combine a race and gender cause of
action on the grounds that such permissive pleading would grant Black women
preferential treatment.50 If neither Black men nor white women could combine race and
gender claims, then permitting Black women to do so would elevate their claims over
everyone elses', thus turning Black women into a superclass of plaintiffs who could
jump ahead of all others with a standing leap. 5 1 Of course, under prevailing
antidiscrimination law, neither Black men nor white women must combine causes of
action to make their specific complaints legible. Building upon MacKinnon's
interrogation of anti-discrimination discourse here, one might ask: Why is it preferential
to give Black women what they need simply because, unlike white women and Black
men, they are the ones who need it? 52 The problem begins on day one, when
antidiscrimination law is shaped narrowly around the experiences of women who are not
racial minorities and around racial minorities who are not women. This might be framed
as a built-in preference in antidiscrimination law - a playing out within the category
woman or Black of the same conundrums of sameness and difference that are evident
within equality discourse writ large.
It is not only relative to white women and Black men that the rules of
antidiscrimination law recreate the sameness/different paradox highlighted by
MacKinnon's radical feminist critique. MacKinnon also provides analytic clarity in
framing another telling difference - specifically, the way that Black women's double
discrimination claims are fundamentally distinct from another type of compound claim:
white men claiming reverse discrimination. In many affirmative action cases alleging
reverse discrimination, 5 3 white men are routinely permitted to make the same kind of

49. TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 12, at 222.

50. Demarginalizing,supra note 14, at 142 (citing the court's reasoning that the authors of Title Vll could
not have meant to create a new class for Black women, who would have more grounds for their claims than,
say, Black men).
51. Id.
52. A more moderate but similarly problematic approach reflecting the imperative to keep Black women
from securing some superwoman status in the antidiscrimination game was to permit Black women to choose
one group with which they would cast their lot, but prohibit them from claiming both race and gender
discrimination. See Ann Scales, DisappearingMedusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory, 20 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 34, 39 (1997) (describing a 1979 case concerning aerospace employees in Los Angeles, where
the judge prohibited Black women from joining both a subclass challenging race discrimination and a subclass
challenging sex discrimination).
53. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that employer's
affirmative action plan that reserved fifty percent of openings in training program for Black employees until the
percentage of Black craftworkers in plant more closely matched percentage of Blacks in local labor force did
not violate Title VII); ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that as a prima facie case,
White male plaintiff alleging reverse discrimination where Black female hired for position he sought need not
present evidence of "background circumstances" that establish that defendant is "unusual employer" who
discriminates against the majority); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009) (holding that because the City of
New Haven failed to demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that it believed it would be subject to disparateimpact liability if it failed to take race-conscious, discriminatory action, it's decision to discard the tests for
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compound discrimination claims that so troubled the courts when Black women made
them. 54 As plaintiffs, white men are similarly situated to Black women relative to the
compound argument they must make. In typical reverse discrimination suits, the
discrimination that white male plaintiffs allege does not operate against all men - since
non-white men are presumably benefited by the policies that the plaintiffs are contesting
- and the discrimination does not operate against all whites - since white women are
presumably included as well. Thus, like the DeGraffenreidwomen, white men cannot
tell a story of race discrimination given the inclusion of white women, nor can they tell a
story of gender discrimination due to the inclusion of Black men. Nevertheless, courts
have refused to acknowledge the fact that white men are making compound
discrimination claims in challenging race and gender-based affirmative action programs.
Interestingly, courts decline to lecture these plaintiffs about the risks of opening
Pandora's Box; nor do they worry about white males becoming a superclass of plaintiffs
that will inevitably leap over all others simply by combining race and gender claims.
Indeed, to date it is difficult to find a single case where a court has discounted a white
male claim by declaring that a white male is not claiming to be discriminated against as a
male, but only as a white male. In contrast to the court's perceptions of Black female
complaints, the notion that discrimination against a white male is something lesser than,
and completely distinct from, discrimination against whites as a whole, or males as a
whole is almost unthinkable.
So what might explain this apparent anomaly? MacKinnon is helpful here as well,
acknowledging that the law does reflect a subjective vantage point. As I argued in
Demarginalizing,one can catch a glimpse of this subjective grounding in the way the
apparently analytically identical claims of white men and Black women were analyzed
differently. 55 Black women caused a doctrinal crisis, yet white men's claims barely
registered as a structural challenge to antidiscrimination law. Black women are indeed
seen as making a two-step compound claim - an unusual demand for preferential
treatment - in contrast to white men who are not seen as making a claim for preferential
treatment either in their pleading, or in the substantive claims they are making. The
irony that they are contesting what they call "preferential treatment" through pleadings
that courts have perceived as themselves "preferential" is wholly obscured. This apparent

promotion of a class of seventeen White and two Hispanic firefighters because no Black firefighters passed the
exam, violated Title VII). United States v. Brennan, No. 08-5171, 2011 WL 1679850 (2d Cir. May 5, 2011)
(holding that district court's certification of class of white male employees in Title VII disparate-treatment
action was proper); Bishop v. Gainer, 272 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying monetary and injunctive relief to
certified class of white males, but not questioning prudence of certification of white male class); Culver v. City
of Milwaukee, 202 F.3d 272 (holding, inter alia, that district court's initial certification of class of "all male
applicants for hire as sworn officers with the Milwaukee Police Department" was a valid class certification in
reverse discrimination suit).
54. For example, in Weber, even though the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the affirmative action policy
favoring women and minorities that the United Steelworkers had implemented, it never considered the question
of whether the claim brought by the white male plaintiff might be inadequately representative of a race

discrimination claim because the alleged injury did not extend to white women, or of a gender discrimination
claim because the injury did not extend to men of color. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).

55. See Demarginalizing, supra note 14, at 150-52 ("Race and sex ... become significant only when they
operate to explicitly disadvantage the victims; because the privileging of whiteness or maleness is implicit, it is

generally not perceived at all.").
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paradox provides a glimpse into the law's subjectivity, specifically, how
antidiscrimination law anchors both race and gender discrimination in the white male
imagination. Beginning from that subject position, race discrimination is what it means
to be a man who is not white; gender discrimination is what it is to be a white who is not
male. From this point of view, the discrimination experienced by Black female plaintiffs
is not one distinct form of discrimination but two: Because they could not be imagined to
be merely men of a darker hue nor whites with a higher voice, Black women were in
effect two steps removed from white men. By contrast, white male plaintiffs need not
first make themselves white or male to be understood as making a gender or race claim.
Their claims are not seen as compounded because they are not two steps removed from
the imagined legal subject; they are the starting position. This subjectivity, framed by
MacKinnon as male relative to gender claims, is also white relative to race claims. It is
this grounding that renders the conceptual similarity between Black women's claims and
white male claims invisible. Dominance theory reveals law's gender; intersectionality
reinforces this exposure, and brings to the fore its whiteness as well.
What then is the relationship between these two projects, the dominance approach
and the intersectional project? Are they just incidentally congruent on some points? Or
might they be thought of as setting forth related critiques of the liberal legalist
conceptions of discrimination at various levels of generalization? If they are simply
incidentally convergent, then dominance theory and intersectionality may - despite
their superficial connections - reflect contradictory orientations toward gender, race,
and women of color. Under the congruent view, both analytics are similarly oriented as a
critique of dominant understandings of equality, a critique built not from theory in the
abstract but fashioned out of the law's response to particular demands made by women
who sought to challenge the specific dimensions of their subordination. If a case for this
congruence can be made, then it may suggest that dominance theory - despite many
claims to the contrary - is not all about an imposition of sameness, and intersectionality
- despite its mobilization as a demand for Black female exceptionalism - is not all
about racial difference. If so, these projects are not, in the end, presumptively or
inevitably at odds with each other, but are important articulations of a common critique.
THIRD ENCOUNTER: THE VIRTUAL MACKINNON
The third encounter is with the virtual MacKinnon, a two-dimensional hologram
constructed out of discourses engendered by the figure of MacKinnon as much if not
more than by her writing. For many, the conceptual images of the white feminist
character cross the imaginary terrain before any particular words do, establishing an
array of assumptions and predispositions that substitute reputational consumption of the
figure for active engagement with her work. In the classroom, my efforts to prompt a
refinement of the virtual MacKinnon have often stretched my skills as a teacher
committed to challenging, provoking, and inspiring new thinking among curious and
socially conscious graduate students. In this context, what emerges is a sense of the
differential capital associated with projects that contest gender power as opposed to those
that contest race.
In each seminar, we explore a variety of theories and writers on various topics
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pertaining to feminism, antiracism, queer theory, and the convergences and tensions
between them. I have taught these classes long enough to be able to note generational
trends, say, between students of the mid 1990's, and students who have come of age
within the current post-feminist era. Many of the students who would gravitate to
Intersectionalities are part of the Critical Race Studies program at UCLA, while my
students at Columbia represent a socially progressive cohort from law, women's studies,
social work, and other disciplines. Students in both institutions lean toward careers in
social justice advocacy. Antiracism and feminism are both clearly indicated as among
the key topics that the seminar will engage.
Given both the seminar descriptions and the population from which the students
come, I have occasionally been surprised by the quick and dismissive way that feminism
is cabined and framed by a significant cohort of my students, particularly in comparison
to the relatively robust investments in antiracism that is manifested in the classroom
discussion. Of course the shrinking social capital associated with feminism is nothing
particularly new; the debate about whether feminist consciousness manifests itself in
recognizable forms across generations is probably as old as feminism itself.56 Whether
the conversation is marked by the notion of waves (as in second wave, third, etc.) or by
temporal references that modify the brand of feminism at issue (post-feminist, neofeminists) or something else), there are numerous indicators that suggest a certain
distancing from what is perceived to be a crude and unappealing feminism. This
distancing has been the subject of analysis and debate for some time, but the particular
version of it that emerges most forcefully in my Intersectionalities course wraps its logics
either implicitly or explicitly around the primacy of race. This relatively traditional strain
of argument frames feminism as a white woman's thing while certain male-centric
ideologies about racism continue to win the allegiance of many of my progressive
students. This stance rarely involves an explicit rejection of feminism per se, but instead
a race-centered critique that repudiates white feminism as an embodiment of racism and
hierarchy. Inevitably, MacKinnon's iconic status in legal discourse places her at the
epicenter of this frame.
Students have of course heard of MacKinnon and may have encountered her work
in Constitutional Law and in other courses. By the time they arrive in Intersectionalities,
she is no stranger to most of them. On occasion, I have been fortunate enough to have
MacKinnon present in class. But often the MacKinnon who emerges in the student
discussion and reaction papers is not the MacKinnon who lives and breathes. 5 7 At times,

56. For examples of works that address the diminishing appeal of feminism among young women, see
generally JESSICA VALENTI, FULL FRONTAL FEMINISM: A YOUNG WOMAN'S GUIDE TO WHY FEMINISM
MATTERS (2007); see also ASTRID HENRY, NOT MY MOTHER'S SISTER: GENERATIONAL CONFLICT AND

THIRD-WAVE FEMINISM (2004) (discussing conflicts between the second-wave and third-wave feminists);
Angela McRobbie, Post-Feminismand PopularCulture, 4 Feminist Media Stud. 255, 255 (2004) (noting that
for the new generation of women, feminism seems old and redundant); Jen Nedeau, Is Feminism Dead? An
Overview ofPost-Feminism, CHANGE.ORG (Oct. 4, 2008), http://womensrights.change.org/blog/view/isfemi
nism-dead anoverview of post-feminism (arguing that postfeminism represents a "backlash" against the
feminist movement).
57. For example, some responses to MacKinnon's work by students enrolled in a class called
Intersectionality criticize what they view as MacKinnon's separation of gender and race in conceptualizing
pornography and sexual violence against women, while some others note that from a personal standpoint,
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she appears as the same stock character that she herself invokes to critique the
essentialisms that are sometimes at play in critique of MacKinnon.58 Indeed, some take
MacKinnon's riff on the mythical white woman literally - her effort to critique the
stereotype by invoking it becomes conflated with the character doing the writing.
Given the close readings and balanced debate that characterize our discussions of
other texts, I am sometimes mystified by the intensity of the critique that surfaces in our
discussions. Although the critical weapon of choice is antiessentialism, students rarely
define what they mean by the term, often use essentialist categories to support their own
arguments, and usually fail to explore other potential essentialisms that, if true of
MacKinnon, are certainly true of almost every other theorist we discuss. Indeed, by the
time we have arrived at MacKinnon, we have often read numerous articles that both
historicize and demonstrate patriarchal sensibilities that have informed antiracism. We
have talked about the patriarchal center of the "benign neglect" debacle represented by
the Moynihan report 59 and the tepid, male-centered responses to it. 60 We have discussed
antiracist claims made by Black, Latino, Asian, and Native American communities that
center the subordination of men in defining the essential character of race discrimination.
We explore the investments and practices that function to elevate male leadership in
defining the terms of resistance against racial subordination.61 In the international arena,

sexism has caused less harm in their lives than racism, and suggest that white feminists address the concerns of
women of color less ably than men of color do. At least one reader has suggested that these patterns are likely
to be context specific, i.e. that the students drawn to "Intersectionalities" may be far more conversant with and
defensive of a race based project than a gender-based one, and that the asymmetries I note herein might be
reversed in courses that center gender more explicitly. Others, however, have noted a similar pattern in which
essentialist concerns are readily engaged in the context of feminism, while rarely raised with respect to
antiracism. They also note, however, that race does not as a general matter, enjoy the same airtime as gender.
58. See MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 18-19 ("This creature is not poor, not battered, not raped (not really),
not molested as a child, not pregnant as a teenager, not prostituted, not coerced into pornography, not a welfare
mother, and not economically exploited. She doesn't work. She is either the white man's image of her effete, pampered, privileged, protected, flighty, and self-indulgent - or the Black man's image of her - all
that, plus the 'pretty white girl' (meaning ugly as sin but regarded as the ultimate in beauty because she is
white.").
59. Daniel P. Moynihan, Office of Pol'y Planning and Research, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Negro Family:
The Case for National Action (1965) [hereinafter Moynihan Report], available at http://www.dol.gov/oa
sam/programs/history/webid-meynihan.htm (arguing that single-parent Black families, illegitimacy, and
matriarchal dynamics are contributing factors to the high incidence of poverty among Blacks). In recent years
there has been a resurgent interest in the Moynihan Report. Though the Moynihan Report's central argument
that the staggering poverty of Black families was in part correlated with the absence of two-parent headed
nuclear families was greatly criticized by civil rights activists in the 1960s and 1970s as, inter alia, victim
blaming (William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (1971)) and simply racist (id), William Wilson and others have
reclaimed the Moynihan Report. William Julius Wilson, The Moynihan Report and Research on the Black
Community, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. & Soc. Sci. 34, 44 (2009) (arguing that Moynihan's attempts to
"synthesize structural and cultural analyses to understand the dynamics of poor black families and the plight of
low-skilled black males" provided an invaluable framework to "capture the complexity and
multidimentionality of culture" that contribute to the reproduction of poverty over time.). See also WILLIAM
WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR IN THE INNER CITY (2010).
60. See generally LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF
CONTROVERSY (1967).

61. For a discussion of how antiracist discourse has often centered around the experiences of men of color
by default, see Harris, supra note 12, at 59 and accompanying text; See also Lovelace v. Canada,
Communication No. 24/1977, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 13th Sess., in Selected Decisions Under the Optional
Protocol, at 83, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985) (holding that Canada was in violation of Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protecting the right of minorities to practice their culture
and be in community with fellow minority group members, but declining to rule on the sex discrimination

172

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46:151

we explore efforts both by nationalists and Western feminists to elevate certain gender
practices as essentially cultural either to defend "traditional culture" against the ravages
of colonialism or to present poster-ready images of the cultural oppression of Third
World women. 62 We have considered the gender solipsisms integrated within the
brilliant analysis of some of the most prescient critics of anti-Black racism such as
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, 63 and we also have gone deep into the explicitly
misogynist rhetorics of Eldridge Cleaver.64 Of course, the famous quip from Stokely
Carmichael that the position of women in the civil rights movement is "prone" finds its
way into the analysis, 65 as do other rhetorical politics that seek to build collective action

inherent in governmental legislation that stripped women who married non-Native men of their Native
Canadian status but not Native Canadian men who married non-Native women); Alma M. Garcia, The
Development of ChicanaFeminist Discourse, 1970-1980, 3 GENDER & Soc'Y 217, 219-21 (1989) (detailing
the struggle of Chicana feminists to achieve equality not just in American society but also within the "maledominated nationalist movement," and comparing this to the analogous obstacles that Black and Asian
American feminists confronted).
62. See, e.g., Uma Narayan, Essence of Culture and a Sense of History: A Feminist Critique of Cultural
Essentialism, 13 HYPATIA 86 (1998) (drawing parallels between gender essentialism and cultural essentialism).
63. For a discussion of patriarchy inherent in the ideas of Malcolm X, see Patricia Hill Collins, Learning to
Think for Ourselves: Malcolm X's Black Nationalism Reconsidered, in MALCOLM X: INOUR OWN IMAGE 59,
74-81 (Joe Wood ed., 1992). For an exploration of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s conceptions of women's roles in
the civil rights movement, see MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, I MAY NOT GET THERE WITH YOU: THE TRUE MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 298 (2000).

64. For a notable example of Cleaver's misogyny see ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 14-15 (1968)
(arguing that he raped white women as part of an assault on the white community; also arguing that he
"practiced" on Black women first). For examples of criticism of Cleaver's misogyny see, e.g., PAULA
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 310
(1984); BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS 58-59 (1990); Kimberl6

Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1255 n. 47 (1990).
65. For discussion of the Carmichael quote and general attitudes within the civil rights movement toward
women in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, see WINIFRED BREINES, THE TROUBLE BETWEEN
Us: AN UNEASY HISTORY OF WHITE AND BLACK WOMEN IN THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT 27 (2006).

66. To clarify, I am not arguing that the slate of essentialist critiques of antiracist theories and practice is
clear. There are in fact, several strains of argumentation about the contours of antiracist discourse that might
be deemed anti-essentialist. Black feminists, for example, have repeatedly signaled discontent with the
gendered dimensions of Black theory and practice. See, e.g. Devon W. Carbado, Men in Black, 3 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 427, 428 (2000) (discussing the emergence of sustained Black feminist critiques of antiracist
discourse in the 1970s). Representing another angle, essentialist critiques greeted the emergence of Critical
Race Theory (see "INTRODUCTION," CRT READER, supra note 18) and continue to circulate as counterarguments against what is perceived to be the expansion of "race discrimination" beyond its original
boundaries to address matters of culture and choice. See generally RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A
CRITIQUE (2004), RICHARD T. FORD, THE RACE CARD: How BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS

WORSE (2009). Indeed, there is a robust debate about whether the entire antiracist project is gerrybuilt on an
essentialist notion of Blackness, a critique emerging from some strains of post-colonial criticism; see
generallyPaul Gilroy, Race Ends Here, 21 RACIAL & ETHNIC STUD. 838, 842 (1998) (offering an
antiessentialist critique of antiracist and anti-fascist activism) and Stuart Hall, Old andNew Identities, Old and
New Ethnicities, in THEORIES OF RACE AND RACISM: A READER 152 (Les Back & John Solomos eds.,

2000). Elsewhere, there are those who critique the dominance of the Black/white paradigm in
antidiscrimination law and antiracist practices more broadly. See generally Juan Perea, Black/White Binary
Paradigmof Race: The Normal Science ofAmerican Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213 (1997) (arguing
that the Black/white paradigm's tendency to "truncate history for the sake of telling a linear story of progress"
distorts the history of racism in America as well as contributes to the marginalization of non-Black persons of
color). So while anti-essentialism frames some discourses within and about anti-racism, the particular
investment that drives the analysis set forth herein is built around two objectives: one is to understand the
critique of feminist essentialism by those who defend - rightfully so, in many cases - the 'strategic
essentialism' of antiracism. The second is to posit for further debate the possibility that even among those
committed to a practice of non-essentialism, there are differences in the tone and intensity of the critique that
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around a male subject. Yet, despite the implicit and often explicit marginalization of
women in virtually all of these anti-racist projects, the epistemological and political
practices that they represent never generate the sweeping critiques that MacKinnon's
theorizing engenders.
Recently, I have attempted to more closely examine how explicitly male-centric
claims escape essentialist critique when manifested in political arguments, group
formations, and policy interventions around race while dominance feminism engenders
scathing critique as irretrievably essentialist. 66 I've wanted to understand how those who
are strikingly critical of reductive accounts of gender oppression make room for projects
that are explicitly wrapped around essentialist conceptions of racial oppression. More
specifically, I've sought to understand: What exactly is the bill of particulars against
MacKinnon's feminism that generates so much traction in my classroom? Three basic
arguments come to the fore, each of which entails either a complex maneuver around
MacKinnon's actual texts or, alternatively, an effort to rationalize what appears to be a
selective deployment of the essentialist critique.
Perhaps the most common set of arguments presents MacKinnon as a white
feminist who ignores the realities of women of color by insisting that their experiences
are essentially the same as those of white women. Accordingly, MacKinnon does not pay
attention to the actual conditions of women of color, but instead simply maps these
conditions onto white women's experiences in a superficial effort to appear to be
inclusive. For example, a common reaction to What Is a White Woman Anyway? reads
MacKinnon's effort to disrupt the essentialist figure of "the white woman" as evidence
that her principle concern is to shore up white women as the central subject of feminism.
MacKinnon's argument that her analysis is built up from the multiple ways in which
women-including women of color-say that they experience discrimination invites
little engagement among critical students.67 To the contrary, some draw a hard line here,
arguing that MacKinnon's theory is modeled on white women and simply imposed on

reflect something other than mere theoretical investment. This is not, as yet, an empirically driven claim but
one more appropriately viewed as an observation about the political contours of race and gender
argumentation. It also bears noting that the aforementioned critiques of "race essentialism" are themselves
somewhat differently mobilized. The critiques made by theorists such as Gilroy for example might be equally
deployed against those who hope to disrupt the Black/white paradigm by creating alternative schools that
simply substitute one "essentialist subject" for another. In a sense, the internal debate between theorists who
ground their projects in the group experiences of Blacks, Latinos, Asians, etc. belies a common orientation that
is more closely lined up to the argument pursued here. Their concerns are frequently not so much about the
sins of essentialist thinking per se, but about the politicized contours of social justice claims and their rhetorical
frames. In other words, what seems to be at stake is less a debate about essentialism and more of a debate
about how the center and periphery of anti-discrimination discourse are constructed. See Devon W. Carbado,
Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L REv. 1283 (2001); Peller, supra note 21.
67. For example, MacKinnon characterizes her method as bottom-up rather than top-down, calling for
feminists to "build a theory out of women's practice, comprised of the diversity of all women's experiences,"
rather than creating theory "out of abstractions" and "the images forced on us by male dominance."
MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 22. While it is certainly possible to dispute whether the intention to build from
bottom up ensures the theory works for all women - theory after all is a human exercise subject to
interpretation - one has to at least recognize that a challenge is being made with examples, and counter this
challenge with examples of interventions that suggest the opposite, namely, the theory gets it wrong more than
incidentally. This is one of the challenges moving the conversation away from reliance on stereotype or tenor
of the argument to its details.
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women of color without their consent or voice.
A second response is that even when MacKinnon addresses the subordination of
women of color, her singular focus on gender denigrates other dynamics that
simultaneously play out against these women. By these lights, MacKinnon's primary
focus on gender effectively elevates it to the most important if not exclusive factor
contributing to their situation. Critics argue here that MacKinnon's theory operates on
the assumption that the differences that matter are only differences of degree, and that
the qualitative differences between women escape theorization and thus effective
intervention.
A third theme that frequently emerges is explicitly comparative, partly in response
to my queries about the apparently less objectionable essentialisms that circulate within
antiracist formations. In response to these challenges, students produce some variant of
the idea that racism within feminism is a far more significant concern than sexism within
antiracist formations. For some, the position is based on an argument that there is far
more intimacy, shared interest and trust between men and women within racial groups
that between women as a whole. This greater intimacy is presumed to create more
empathy within racially marginalized groups. This empathy moderates, if not eliminates,
concerns about how subgroups such as women, sexual minorities, and other group
members will fair in the construction of a politic built around male-centric visions of
racism.
The aforementioned are some of the more common themes that arise in the
classroom encounter with MacKinnon but perhaps the most significant and abiding
foundation upon which others are based is that there is a profound racial difference
between women and, correspondingly, an essential intra-racial sameness between men
and women of color. In sum, this analytic frame gravitates perilously close to a
reification of race that appears as formulaic as the view of an essential sameness among
women that the students are arguing against. Expressed both in terms of the presumed
whiteness of MacKinnon's feminist subject and presumed commonality among nonwhite
women, race serves as the foundation of their critique of MacKinnon's gender
fundamentalism. 6 8
Aside from these categorical claims about the inherent differences between white
women and women of color, there is little analysis of how and to what degree these
differences make a difference in the interventions that MacKinnon's theory brings to
bear. As I will elaborate below, assertions of difference between women tell us very
little about how these differences misshape or distort feminist praxis. Yet "difference" is
all-too-often the central claim behind skepticism or outright opposition to MacKinnon's
68. Of course, the origins of these critiques are not mysterious as they variously reflect the range of
criticisms that have emerged in the cottage industry of academic work that has sprung up around MacKinnon's
theory. What may be significant about how these debates circulate among students is the degree to which the
readily articulable critiques of MacKinnon's feminism, alongside the relatively tepid discourses around
essentialism in antiracism, leaves students with the task of intuiting the rationale for such asymmetries. This
pattern leaves to the students the task of reconciling the different rhetorical postures, and they in turn draw
inferences that are sometimes more stark and even essentialist than more nuanced critiques in the literature.
These inferences may not fully encompass the perceptions of MacKinnon's academic critics. At minimum, the
classroom may profound a sound-check for some critics who otherwise invest in the feminist project to be more
attentive to the various ways that the asymmetries might be read and re-enacted
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insistence that domination "as women" is legible as an expression of social power.
Critics' deployment of women of color as evidence of an apparently insurmountable
difference between women, as well as the whiteness of MacKinnon's subject, is
particularly striking in response to What is a White Woman Anyway? There, MacKinnon
challenged critics to reconcile the presumed whiteness of her theory with the arguments
of Mechelle Vinson and Lillian Garland, two African American women who brought suit
against their employer alleging discrimination as women.69 Mechelle Vinson was the
plaintiff in the landmark case that established sexual harassment as a cognizable injury
under sex discrimination law, 70 while Garland's complaint led to the Supreme Court
permissive interpretation of Title VII's Pregnancy Discrimination Act affirming that the
PDA was no bar to state legislation requiring pregnancy leave regardless of whether the
employer provided other disability-based leaves. 7 1 Both of these doctrinal advances,
MacKinnon argues, grew from these plaintiffs' understanding that they were
experiencing discrimination as women.72
In foregrounding these two women, MacKinnon, perhaps not ironically, echoes the
age-old question raised by and about Black women: Aren't these women experiencing
discrimination as women? 73 More pointedly, does the notion that Vinson and Garland
are challenging their discrimination "as women" denigrate from myriad other factors that

69. See id. at 15.

70. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment occurring in the
workplace, where it creates a hostile work environment, is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under
Title VII).
71. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (holding that Title VII, as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), does not prohibit employment practices favoring pregnant
women, and further holding that CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2), which required that employers reinstate
women after a reasonable disability leave, was not pre-empted by the PDA). The case caused a major rift
between feminist legal scholars and organizations. Some feminists worried that protection against
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy threatened to re-inscribe a separate spheres mentality that would
reinforce the current gender system. Others argued that pregnancy leave was consistent with gender neutrality
in that it equalized procreative choices in an employment regime built on the assumption that workers are men.
Compare Wendy Williams, Notes From a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 101 (1989) (arguing
against the holding in Cal Fed from a position of formal equality on the basis that CAL. GOv'T CODE §
12945(b)(2) and the PDA taken together should be interpreted to provide workers disabled by causes other than
pregnancy the same protection as pregnant workers) with Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1298 (1987) (defending the holding in Cal Fed on the grounds that the California
statute can be read to recognize equality of the choice to procreate insofar as if not for provision adequate leave
time for pregnant women, women will not be able to make a meaningful procreative choice).
72. MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 15 ("The arguments that won these cases were based on the plaintiffs'
lives as women, on insisting that actual social practices that subordinated them as women be theoretically
recognized as impermissible sex-based discrimination under law. In the process, sexual assault and
reproduction became sex equality issues, with implications for the laws of rape and abortion, among others.").
73. "Ain't I a Woman," is a refrain that refers to the story of Sojourner Truth and has been widely cited for
the proposition that Black women stand as a ready refutation of the separate spheres ideology that held women
as a group to be considerably weaker and thus less prepared to enter political life than men. See Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing,supra note 14, at 153. See also Cheryl Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender,and
the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 313; Dorothy Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the
Meaning of Motherhood, I AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 16 (1993). Historian Nell Painter casts doubt on whether
Truth really uttered these words and has suggested that the frequently cited episode where Truth was said to
have delivered this rhetorical call was embellished by white women to advance the suffrage cause. NELL IRVIN
PAINTER, SOJOURNER TRUTH: A LIFE, A SYMBOL 206 (1996). Interestingly, this possibility does little to alter
the basic argument, that namely, the racial dimensions of Black women's status as "woman" has both been
contested and has also proved politically useful to challenge certain assumptions about the inherent nature of
"women."
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also shape their lives? If theory is, as MacKinnon argues, built from practice, then
arguably the practice of these women in challenging the circumstances of employment
"as women" gives rise to a theory of sex discrimination that exists in the face of racial
particulars. Indeed, the case for encompassing these racial particulars may be even
stronger than MacKinnon suggests, especially in the case of Vinson. Given the antiracist
sensibilities that enabled so many of the early sexual harassment plaintiffs to
conceptualize sexual aggression as a form of discrimination rather than mere workplace
flattery, 74 racial difference may not be merely coextensive with feminist theory but may
be an agent of it.
The role of Vinson and Garland in both feminist theory and in MacKinnon's article
is particularly significant in confronting the central premises around difference within
feminism, quite simply what difference difference makes. This question takes on added
significance in light of the contradictory way in which racial difference has figured
within critiques of an antidiscrimination law (for denying women of color protection
because they were deemed to be "different") and then again as a critique of feminist
essentialism (for collapsing all differences into a unified narrative of women's
oppression.)
From at least one vantage point, the ability of Vinson and Garland to represent
women in both the theory and doctrine can be read as an affirmation that their claims can
be authorized as "what happens to women" in a way that includes their racial
particularities. Indeed, the incorporation of their claims may mark a progressive
broadening of doctrine and theory, particularly in light of the contrast between what the
Courts' conclusions might have been in the not-too-distant past when the sexuality and
reproductive capacities of Black women were regulated under racially distinct and
stratified rules. 75 An allegation of discrimination involving Black women and sex might
74. The Civil Rights Movement, and its subsequent Black Consciousness dimensions encouraged African
Americans to resist not only the structural dimensions of white supremacy but also the interpersonal
dimensions of racial power. For men, these interpersonal dimensions of racism often included emasculating
violations of their personal dignity, and for women, it frequently included sexual assault and other forms of
violation both in their place of employment and in the public arena as well. If "don't call me boy" could be
widely understood among African Americans as a demand for racial equality, certainly "don't sexually assault
me" could also be understood as part and parcel of a racialized pattern of sexual abuse that was actively
contested under the rubric of anti-racism and equal citizenship. See, Kimberld Crenshaw, Address at the Yale
Law School Symposium on Sexual Harassment Law: Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of Catherine A.
MacKinnon's SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF THE WORKING WOMEN, "The Intersections of Black Power and
Feminism: How Antiracism Gave Rise to Sexual Harassment Law," (Feb. 27, 1999). In fact, Mayeri argues that
Black women were far more central in the development of modem feminism, and in particular, gender
antidiscrimination law, than has previously been acknowledged. See MAYER, supra note 15 (detailing how
contrary to conventional misunderstandings of how gender equality 'borrowed' from antiracism, antiracism
was constitutive of gender-based advocacy). Key Black feminists such as lawyer Pauli Murray saw the
interconnections between racism and sexism from the beginning and formulated strategies to build on their
interface. Murray's genius was not simply conceptual but strategic. As Mayeri writes: "At a time when most
civil rights leaders, not to mention government officials saw feminism and Black progress as mutually
exclusive, to model arguments for women's rights on the case for racial justice was both subversive and savvy.
Reasoning from race allowed black feminists to invoke paradigms already accepted by the civil rights and legal
establishments and to highlight the benefits of allying themselves with a numerous and potentially powerful
constituency -white women." Id. at 50.
75. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1467, 1470
(1991) (discussing practices that associate the race of Black women with a lack of veracity or chastity). Darlene
Clark Hine details how the rape of African American women seldom led to prosecutions when their assailants
were white, a fact that Jeanette Dunn attributes to the organization of women's caucus that in turn constituted

2010

CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF THREE KINDS

177

have easily been dismissed out of hand because Black women have long been regarded
as simply different from white women, lacking in chastity, veracity and respectability. 76
Even in more "enlightened" times, the capacity of Black women to stand as class
representatives for all women has been questioned by judges who seemed to regard
Black women as something less, yet, at the same time, also something more, than just a
woman. One need only recall the Moore Court's pointed claim that the Black female
plaintiff who sought class representative status for all women had not argued that she
was discriminated against as a woman, "but only as a Black female." 77 Her racial
identity constituted a difference that was not one of degree but one of kind.
Judges are far from the only observers who make troubling assertions of racial
difference between women. In the broader political arena, the very case that brought
sexual harassment to public consciousness prompted a jaw-dropping claim by a leading
Black scholar that Black women were so different from white women that behavior that
might have constituted harassment against white women was merely harmless banter
when engaged in amongst Black men and women. This claim, made by Orlando
Patterson in an op-ed in the New York Times, positioned Anita Hill as a Black woman
who was essentially acting white by claiming to have experienced Clarence Thomas's
pornographically laden "repartee" as discriminatory. That the argument was advanced at
all was troubling enough, but that it was packaged as one of the few insights about the
debacle worthy of inclusion in the august New York Times suggests more: that age-old
stereotypes of Black female sexuality could readily escape proscription as racist and
sexist, especially when argued intraracially. The fact that the very stereotypes that had
historically justified the exclusion of Black women from the rather limited protections
against sexual abuse that white women enjoyed could be so readily reproduced suggests
how robust the racialized discourse of difference has been. More importantly, it reveals
how easily assertions of difference among women can be deployed toward antifeminist
ends.
The simple point here is that the political work that difference does among women
is contradictory and warrants careful reflection. Absent contextual analysis that delivers
more than a simple assertion of racial difference, conventional critiques of feminism that
ground themselves in differences between women come dangerously close to reifying

the infrastructure of the Montgomery Bus Boycott. DARLENE CLARK HINE, 1 BLACK WOMEN INAMERICA 22
(2005); JEANETTE R. DUNN, SOUTHERN WOMEN AT THE MILLENNIUM 75 (2003). Rosa Parks, who in the civil
rights lore, was tired seamstress who refused to give up her seat, was in fact activist who had agitated on behalf
of several Black women who were sexually assaulted and never saw their cases prosecuted. See DANIELLE L.
McGuIRE, AT THE DARK END OF THE STREET: BLACK WOMEN, RAPE, AND RESISTANCE - A NEW HISTORY
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM ROSA PARKS TO THE RISE OF BLACK POWER (discussing how the
struggle against these differential and stratified rules governing the sexual autonomy of Black women
constitutes a key but underappreciated point of departure of the Civil Rights movement).
76. GIDDINGS, supra note 64, at 31; E. FRANCES WHITE, DARK CONTINENT OF OUR BODIES: BLACK
FEMINISM AND THE POLITICS OF RESPECTABILITY 78 (2001) (describing how feminists such as Davis, Barbara
Ramsby, and Kimberl6 Crenshaw created the African American Agenda 2000 in opposition to the March).
77. Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983)
78. Orlando Patterson, Op-Ed., Race, Gender and Liberal Fallacies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991, at E15,
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/20/opinion/op-ed-race-gender-and-liberal-fallacies.html
at
available
(dismissing Clarence Thomas's advances to Hill as merely a "down-home style of courting," and calling Hill
"unfair and disingenuous" for having brought the allegations of harassment against Thomas).
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women into the very polar categories that have traditionally situated women of color as
something other than women.
As argued above, both dominance theory and the intersectional frame take up the
ways in which operating exclusively within either a sameness or difference frame can
lead to contradictory and counterproductive debates within equality doctrine. The
meaning that intra-categorical difference makes in such efforts - and, more specifically,
the degree to which such differences must be explicitly incorporated to sustain the kind
of advocacy and intervention that matters on the ground - calls for deft navigation of
both the descriptive and political dimensions of the context. This is a not a defense of
theoretical abstraction but in fact a critique of the very abstractions that operate to deflect
more context specific analysis.
Of course, this challenge is not unique to feminism. In the political terrain where
mass mobilization is animated by notions of common experience and shared agendas,
similar contradictions around sameness and difference play out. Discourses built around
sameness and difference are utterly indeterminate in what they enable and what they
preclude in terms of theory, rhetorical politics and interventionist praxis. As the briefest
reflection of the politics of mass mobilization and reform-seeking discourses reveal,
neither the assertion of difference as a critique of these efforts, nor the attempt to shore
up the critique through reassertion of sameness, provides stable or consistently
progressive critiques.
Sometimes discourses of difference are mobilized to defeat a certain set of
progressive sensibilities. Consider, for example, the history of class politics in the United
States. Traditionally U.S. class hierarchies have been managed and stabilized by the use
of racial difference to divide poor and working people. Similarly some feminist rhetorics
have been constructed to amplify racial difference among women - such as some
nineteenth-century claims around suffrage. Indeed, one school of suffrage argumentation
was premised on portraying white women as worthy and reliable as allies in the efforts to
sustain white supremacy and imperialism. 79
Just as difference has historically been foregrounded in efforts to rationalize and
sustain certain power relations, assertions of sameness have also been used to suppress
the recognition of and advocacy around certain patterns of exclusion and
marginalization. Consider in this regard the current school of thought among a leftleaning cohort committed to colorblind policies. Their arguments for repudiating
affirmative action and other race-targeted interventions are premised on the controversial
narrative that class solidarity between whites and people of color has been undermined
by the race-conscious advocacy of civil rights and Black Power activists.80 Class
79. Kimber6 Crenshaw, The Curious Resurrection of First Wave Feminism in the US. Elections: An
Intersectional Critique of the Rhetoric of Solidarity and Betrayal, in SEXUALITY, GENDER AND POWER;
INTERSECTION AND TRANSNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVES 231-233 (Anna G. J6nasd6ttir, Valerie Bryson &

Kathleen B. Jones eds., 2010).
80. For an example of such tensions playing out between race- and class-based concerns in the labor
movement, consider the Todd Gitlin-Robin Kelley debate that occurred during the "Culture, Identity, and Class
Politics" panel at the October 1996 Columbia Teach-In with the Labor Movement. According to third-person
accounts of the debate, Gitlin dismissed race-based concerns as unnecessarily divisive, while Kelley was
strongly resistant to the idea that class should be the focus of the inquiry to the exclusion of race. See Eric Lott,
The New Liberalism in America: Identity Politics in the "Vital Center," in THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF
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solidarity, under this view, depends upon the repression of racial difference and the
advancement of a politics built on intra-class sameness.
At the same time that exclusion and subordination can be rationalized by both
difference and sameness rhetorics, inclusionary objectives can be similarly enhanced by
assertions of sameness as well as difference. Efforts to create sameness sensibility can
sometimes be productive, especially in resistance to cultural and political histories that
have foregrounded difference to justify or normalize dominance. For instance, one of the
compelling features of modem feminism was to advance a vision of a common
vulnerability as women that was typically obscured by ideological and institutional
conventions - such as the public-private distinction in law - and by prevailing notions
of race and class. In efforts to politicize the everyday practices of domestic violence and
rape, feminists asserted a certain "sameness" in terms of a common vulnerability that
operated against ideological and social distinctions. These distinctions that had earlier
divided women along race and class gave way to new frames that sought to unite them.
By reframing experiences that had been regarded as fragmented and individualized into
patterns of subordination that were reconceived as systemic and group-based, the
concept of "violence against women" came to fore as a social problem. The notion of
"violence against women" reflects the politicized construction of a common vulnerability
"as women" in order to reconceptualize what had been traditionally viewed as a 'private'
problem into a public one. 81
Of course, this effort to gather every day experiences into the politicized frame of
"the subordination of women" did not come without risk; the assertions of sameness that
made the frame viable could at the same time constitute ideological blinders that
militated against the acknowledgement of difference in the development of effective
interventions. Elsewhere I have written about how the ideological and practical
dimensions of domestic violence discourse tragically underserve the needs of some
survivors relative to others. 82 This and other examples remind us how rigid assertions of
WHITENESS 214, 227-28 (Birgit Brander Rasmussen et al. eds., 2001). For a an illustration of a similar
argument in the context of affirmative action in higher education, see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE
REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997) (critiquing what he sees as racial "entitlements"

and arguing for class-based affirmative action instead).
81. See Crenshaw, supra note 64, at 1241 ("Drawing from the strength of shared experience, women have
recognized that the political demands of millions speak more powerfully than the pleas of a few isolated voices.
This politicization in turn has transformed the way we understand violence against women.").
82. For discussion on the multiple levels of subordination suffered by immigrant women facing domestic
abuse, see Crenshaw, supra note 64, at 1249 (noting, for example, the multiple subordination that immigrant
women often face in the domestic violence context: "language barriers present [a] structural problem that often
limits opportunities of non-English-speaking women to take advantage of existing support services. Such
barriers not only limit access to information about shelters, but also limit access to the security shelters
provide."); Nancy K. D. Lemon, Access to Justice; Can Domestic Violence Courts Better Address the Needs of
Non-English Speaking Victims ofDomestic Violence?, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 38 (2006). As many
have noted, domestic violence advocates have overwhelmingly focused on domestic violence that occurs in
heterosexual relationships. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularityand Generality: Challenges of Feminist
Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 50, n.79 (1992) ("The heterosexist
assumption implicit in the term 'battered woman' becomes clear when one considers that the term applies
equally to a woman who is beaten within a heterosexual relationship as well as a woman who is in a lesbian
relationship"). This has the ultimate effect of obfuscating the violence endured by lesbians. See e.g., PHYLLIS
GOLDFARB, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Constructionof Gender in the Discourseof
Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 589 (1996) ("Those who developed [domestic violence]
discourse sought to portray accurately the gothic horrors of battering in heterosexual relationships. They did so
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sameness at the level of intervention can function to marginalize and further subordinate
individuals who are not 'the same' as the imagined survivor of domestic violence.
Theories of women's subordination as well as the interventions that such theories
anticipate will obviously exclude subjects whose contexts are not anticipated,
accommodated, or recognized.
This point closes the analytic loop to return to the point of departure, namely, that
sameness has often been the register through which exclusion has been perpetrated. Of
the many familiar examples is Betty Friedan's classic text, The Feminine Mystique, that
theorized women's oppression in terms of domestic imprisonment of the home; it is
obvious that her conclusions were not informed by the diversity and breadth of women's
experiences in the US, much less around the world.83 This is a use of sameness that
elides difference by using 'women' to substitute a subset for a whole. Its limitations are
classic illustrations of a deductive theory built from inside out, rather than outside in. But
here is where it might be profitable to bear down on the various missteps contained
within Friedan's argument in order to determine how best to think about essentialist
assertions within contemporary feminist practice. There are of course broad questions
about whether there is or is not a proper whole that Friedan elides with her rendition of
"woman's experience," whether it is a universal whole, a whole that exists throughout
time, a whole that is fixed and unchanging or a whole that is temporal and contextual.

effectively, calling public attention to a pervasive and pervasively overlooked system of brutality and
contributing to an understanding of the woman caught in these nightmarish situations. Despite their popular
success in exposing and naming the problem of heterosexual battering, these activist suggest that the entire
problem of battering consisted of male violence against female intimates . . . . [Ultimately, by] failing to
circumscribe the boundaries of the particular problem upon which they focused, these activist silently inscribed
heterosexuality into the meaning of battering."). Heteronormative conceptions of domestic violence have also
proved to obfuscate domestic violence in heterosexual relationships where the female partner is the aggressor.
See e.g., Amanda J. Schmesser, Note, Real Men May Not Cry, But They Are Victims of Domestic Violence:
Bias in the Application of Domestic Violence: Bias in the Application of Domestic Violence Laws, 58
SYRACUSE L. REV. 171 (2007); Linda Kelly, Disabusingthe Definition ofDomestic Abuse: Women Batter Men
andthe Role ofthe Feminist State, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 791, 801 (2003) (generally discussing the mainstream
denial of domestic abuse of heterosexual men at the hands of their female partners; specifically discussing the
trials and tribulations of Suzanne Steinmetz, an early advocate for redressing "husband abuse," who received
threats of physical violence from total strangers and faced extensive lash-back from "every female faculty
member at the University of Delaware" when she sought tenure); Murray A. Straus, The Controversy Over
Domestic Violence by Women: A Methodological, Theoretical,and Sociology ofScience Analysis, in VIOLENCE
ININTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 17, 17-18 (Ximena B. Arriaga & Stuart Oskamp eds., 1999). This pattern extends
to domestic violence in gay relationships. See e.g., Patrick Letellier, Gay andBisexual Male Domestic Violence
Victimization: Challenges to Feminist Theory and Responses to Violence, 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 2, 95 (1994)
(arguing that mainstream feminist domestic violence discourse is inherently heterosexist and fails to explain the
phenomenon of domestic violence in gay male relationships. Ultimately, the illustrations above reflect yet
another essentialist trap. See Jamie R. Abrams, The Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing Violence, 16
WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703 (generally discussing how the domestic violence movement has led to the
further entrechment of "hegemonic masculinity" which, in turn, perpetuates "gender stereotypes positioning all
men as prone to violence and all women as vulnerable to victimization and displacing the men and women that
function outside these binary constructs." (Id. at 703). But cf Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1849, 1856 n. 24 (1996) (arguing that the author's own focus on male violence against women is
legitimately tied to the "historical and institutional marginalization of intimate violence against women"). For
an explicitly anti-essentialist approach to addressing domestic violence, see e.g. Leigh Goodmark, Reframing
Domestic Violence Law and Policy: An Anti-EssentialistProposal,31WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 39 (2009).
83. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 240 (1963) ("Each scientific advance that might have freed
women from the drudgery of cooking, cleaning, and washing, thereby giving her more time for other purposes,
instead imposed new drudgery, until housework not only expanded to fill the time available, but could hardly
be done in the available time").
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These all implicate certain sins of essentialism in one way or another, but on some level,
sanctioning the "essentialism" in The 'Feminine Mystique seems somewhat beside the
point in grasping what seemed "off' about Friedan's argument. It isn't so much
Friedan's assertion of an "essence" that exists across history, nation or class that was so
striking to her critics. It was instead that Friedan wasn't able to provide a convincing
account that included her very contemporaries, women who were distinct in terms of
race and class, and who were certainly within her immediate field of vision. This is
arguably a narrower problem of class and racial solipsism, a set of erasures that are
significant because of their political consequences as well as their philosophical
implications.
Given the wide-ranging scope of what the edict against essentialism presumably
prohibits, it seems unlikely that any formulation of "discrimination as a woman" will
entirely resolve the debate. Yet one wonders on a certain level whether "essentialism" is
really the concern that animates so much of the heated debate around feminism. Perhaps
practical efforts to specify and normalize a theoretical practice that avoids the obvious
solipsisms engendered by such narrow fields of vision might be a better investment of
critical energies in the here and now.
In sum, despite the rhetorical deployment of difference to serve as the foundation
for anti-essentialist critique, not all differences are equally significant in the pursuit of
certain objectives. The relevance of difference depends on the political use for which
claims of group commonality are made, and the flexibility and openness to difference in
shaping the demands and interventions that are realized. These are obviously more
political and contextual questions than philosophical ones. Thus assertions of difference
do not always produce a more illuminating theory or a more productive intervention,
although they sometimes can. But central to the critique of sameness/difference in both
dominance feminism and intersectionality is the fact that the critique of difference does
not reflexively engender the embrace of sameness. In the same way that the
sameness/difference paradigm failed to decenter the male subject against which equality
was measured,84 and in the same way that it rendered Black female plaintiffs too
anomalous as subjects of antidiscrimination law, 85 the sameness/difference debate can
do no more to resolve the essentialist challenge. Sameness/difference discourses that
underlie at least some reservations about dominance feminism elide the recognition that
both positions inevitably reinscribe existing configurations of power. In the case of
resistance discourses, the dimensions of critical discourse must arguably transcend the
sameness/difference straightjacket to embrace more a productive attentiveness to the
ever changing challenges of contesting social power.
The third response to MacKinnon squarely presents an opportunity to exploit the
comparative dimensions of feminist and antiracist mobilizations. The critique lodged
against MacKinnon is that her theorizing lifts gender out of a matrix of subordination in
a manner that elides qualitative differences in women's experience. These experiences
84. See discussion supra p. 106 and note 12 (offering discussion of MacKinnon's sameness/difference
framework).
85. See discussion supra p. 116 (discussing sameness and difference in the context of courts' handling of
Black female plaintiffs).
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cannot be accommodated within a paradigm that foregrounds what women have in
common without distorting or marginalizing the significance of what constitutes the
Thus, efforts to discover, interrogate and contest
difference between them.
discrimination "as women" necessarily suppress the ways that women are embedded in
and thereby invested in contesting other structures. Feminism's implicit expectation of
solidarity is thus framed as inherently partial and to the degree that it minimizes the
comparative urgency of contesting these other structures, appears to be
counterproductive. More significantly, students in this context express an abiding
distrust of intra-gender collaboration across race, and a relatively less critical embrace of
intra-racial coalition across gender. Therein lies at least some part of their skepticism
about the trustworthiness and empathy of white feminists.
While these arguments are certainly debatable on their own terms, what is
significant here is how the analysis loses traction in its interface with antiracism. In
practice, MacKinnon's theorizing about women closely parallels similar analytic moves
that have historically mobilized African Americans as a group to contest the terms of
racial subordination. The parallel tends to be underappreciated in the discourses
surrounding the commensurability of feminist and antiracist mobilizations. Moreover,
the premises upon which intra-racial solidarity and empathy are grounded are not fully
explained by actual antiracist practice.
In the context of antiracism, the conventional politics of solidarity mark decidedly
different orientations toward sameness and difference. Despite the fact that the interface
of race with a host of other factors creates differences among members of racially
vulnerable groups, this reality has not for the most part engendered a skepticism as to
whether experiences are too diverse to support either a project called "racism" nor has it
significantly undermined the notion of common vulnerability as objects of racist policy
and practice. Political action built around narratives of a common vulnerability to
something called 'racism' remain fully legible and sustainable notwithstanding the
obvious reality that the struggle against racial subordination often targets practices that
never effected everyone the same way. Equally compelling, antiracist strategies have not
garnered the allegiance of all who were subject to it, yet the idea of anti-racist struggle
has been widely viewed as a defensible exercise of group agency.
The very notion of social movement inherently implies the foregrounding of
common interests in contesting barriers that impact the group as a whole. The classic
civil rights movement against racial segregation in public accommodations in the
American South was no exception. Take, for example, the sit-in campaigns that sprang
up as students resorted to direct action to challenge what was called the 'second class
citizenship' of American 'Negroes.' It was widely understood that segregation was a
racial barrier that applied to Blacks as a socially-marked group. At the same time,
segregation did not function in the same way against all African Americans. For
example, formal segregation policies were not the only barriers that prohibited poor
Blacks from being served. Even when these formal barriers were lifted, many group
members would lack the economic resources to gain service in the restaurants and lunchcounters that had been liberated by the sit-in activists. Morever, for those Blacks that
could "pass" for white, segregation was potentially less of an intrusive barrier in
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circumscribing their day-to-day lives; their skin color ameliorated certain aspects of
racism, creating experiences that can be said to differ from other identifiable Blacks
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Thus, not only did segregation effect individuals or
sub-groups of African Americans differently, the political imperatives motivating some
Blacks to contest segregation made little difference to those group members who, even
with the formal disability of race lifted, would not want to eat at white lunch counters
under any circumstances.
Yet, the fact that there are differences within a group - different barriers, different
vulnerabilities, and different preferences-does not render the notion of group-based
advocacy less coherent intellectually or less effective politically as meaningful action.
Nor is it the case that the failure to attend to all dimensions of subordination in a
particular campaign normalizes, reinforces or legitimizes the other structures that shaped
the life chances of Blacks as a whole. That there were additional structures and
individual preferences that made Blacks differently situated with respect to the campaign
did not render the project of naming and strategizing around it unintelligible as a political
struggle against a group based harm.
The actions of Blacks that did engage in sit-ins were packed with social meaning
that was well-understood by both supporters and detractors. Segregation, it was
understood, was a practice that affected Blacks as a group notwithstanding the fact that it
might not in practice affect every group member in the same way. Nor did the fact that
some Blacks opposed the campaign alter the common sense understanding of it as "about
race" in general and about "Blacks" in particular. Many Blacks who opposed the sit-ins
believing that the costs of pursuing such confrontational disruptions outweighed the
possible benefits of challenging these entrenched system. 86 However, even the
sentiments of Blacks that opposed the sit-ins should not be interpreted as a challenge to
the coherence of the group. Indeed, it was precisely because of the group's social
legibility that many Blacks sensed a risk of collective or personal loss through the protest
even though they opposed such efforts themselves.
As the sit-ins demonstrate, political action built on common understandings of
group interest has been and continues to be coherent and intelligible to a wide variety of
audiences, including those directly implicated by the contested practices as well as those
who fall outside its reach. One need not think "as a Black" or assume that there is an
essence that defines "Blackness" to understand the protest as group-based action. Yet
these discourses about racism differ substantially from those about gender; it is a
difference that makes for a rhetorical difference in how the two projects are framed and
understood.
This comparison is not offered to simply defend group-based sensibilities against
all criticism. Indeed, such practices can veer drastically off course. A vivid example is
86. See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON & MARGARET WEIR, SCHOOLING FOR ALL: CLASS, RACE, AND THE
DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 183 (1988) (describing the tension between activists in the postwar San
Francisco Black community and moderate Blacks who disapproved of using protest as a means for effecting
social change, wishing instead to achieve change through the legislature and the courts); Glen Feldman,
BEFORE BROWN: CIVIL RIGHTS AND WHITE BACKLASH INTHE MODERN SOUTH 12 (Glen Feldman ed., 2004)
(noting that there were a number of moderate African Americans who did not support the agenda of the Civil
Rights Congress because it was seen as too radical).

184

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46:151

antiracist discourse that centers entirely on men as the primary subject of racial
oppression.
Both historically and in contemporary terms, the objects of structural oppressions
the worker, the colonized, the immigrant, the slave, the Native, and the Negro - have
been imagined as male. Consequently, theories of resistance and the voice of opposition
have also posited a male subject. Although sometimes merely a figure of speech, the
subject of racism is almost always marked as "he" regardless of whether the claim or
demand that follows is in fact gender-specific or is more broadly inclusive.
Neither the figurative use of men as the stand-in for all racialized subjects, nor the
specific articulations of male-centric visions of racial harm have been widely politicized
and critiqued for excluding or marginalizing women. Yet, some of the most common
metaphors through which racism is conceptualized and represented have been malecentric. Lynching, for example, became the symbolic embodiment of the terrorism that
held American Blacks in the perpetual grasp of white supremacy. Although its rationales
were often framed as extrajudicial measures to contain the sexual pathologies of Black
men, in reality the practice extended well beyond punishing Black men accused of sexual
Economic and political dependence, fidelity to the
crimes against white women.
unwritten rules of white dominance, group deference, and social inferiority were all
enforced against African American men and women by the threat of extralegal violence.
Because these dynamics obviously impacted the community as a whole, the male-centric
discourses growing out of these experiences, as well as the campaigns designed to
politicize and resist this dimension of subordination, were accepted as expressing the
interests of the Black community as a whole.
The centering of lynching as the symbolic representation of racist domination is
not problematic because of its emphasis on the gendered particularity of Black men's
experience per se. What is problematic instead is how these gendered expressions of
racism implicated in lynching narratives have the effect of confirming that men - the
only subjects of racism apparent in these narratives - are the principle targets of antiBlack racism. The conceptualization of the subject of anti-Black racism as necessarily
male feeds the belief that the gendered forms of racism that do not map on to Black
men's narratives - essentially those that affect Black women as Black women - are, as
a necessary matter, less significant. Furthermore, a conceptualization of anti-Black
racism as essentially that which constitutes anti-Black-male racism implies that the
gendered forms of racism experienced by Black women constitute a set of particularities
that are not representative of the group but merely collateral effects of the primary
dynamics of racism against men.
The consequences of such interpretations become apparent in contexts where the
habitual inferences around Black male subordination suppress and marginalize the
experiences of Black women. For example, the blinding effect of the lynching trope was
abundantly clear in the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas controversy, where Thomas, having

87. Ida B. Wells, an African American journalist who led a vigorous campaign against lynching in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, analyzed lynching statistics published in newspapers of the time and
found that only about one-third of the victims had been accused of rape. See PAULA J. GIDDINGS, IDA: A
SWORD AMONG LIONS: IDA B. WELLS AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 226-27 (2008).
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made his career distancing himself from antiracist discourses and claims, wrapped his
Thomas's
troubled nomination around the imagery of the lynched Black man.
eleventh-hour shift to the language of Black resistance effectively mobilized the Black
community on his behalf, drowning out any intraracial empathy for Hill. As the inquiry
unfolded, Hill was subjected to the age-old stereotypes about Black female sexuality,
veracity, and sanity. Even though she, rather than he, had a more credible claim to
having been victimized by racially stereotyped imagery, the sensibilities built around
lynching were so entrenched that the mere invocation of it erased Anita Hill as a
recognizable member of the African American community.89
This transition from gendered particularity of racism to what might be called an
essentialist rhetoric around race and racism is represented in what has been called the
Black male endangerment thesis. 90 Most notably represented in the Million Man
March, 9 1 the endangerment thesis typically represents Black male victimization as the
88. During his Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Clarence Thomas referred to Anita Hill's accusations
of sexual harassment as the "high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign to think for
themselves, to do for themselves, to have different ideas . .. you will be lynched, destroyed, caricatured by a
committee of the U.S. Senate rather than hung from a tree." Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary,Part 4, 102d
Cong. 157-58 (1991).
89. See e.g., Jackie Calmes & Jill Abramson, Anita Hill Defends Herselfas Attacks By Thomas Supporters
Grow Sharper, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1991, at A-4 ("After Prof. Hill passed a lie-detector test Sunday,
Republicans pressed speculation that she is emotionally unstable and believes her allegations even though they
are untrue. Previously, GOP lawmakers portrayed her variously as a snubbed woman, a perjurer, a publicity
seeker or a tool of liberal interest groups out to get Judge Thomas."); Lynne Duke & Kevin Sullivan, Cry of
Lynching' Opens Wounds; Thomas's Words Evoke a Range of Emotions Among Blacks in the Area, WASH.
POST, Oct. 13, 1991, at A-1 ("If it is a lynching, Thomas isn't the only victim, said Adrienne Massey, 25 . . .
'This Clarence Thomas 'trial,' which is what it comes down to, is a lynching for black America,' Massey said.
'This should be a sign to black America that the American Dream is really a nightmare for black Americans,'
Massey said. 'No matter what economic or social success you may attain in America, you are still a nigger'.");
Charles Krauthmmer, Editorial, ClarenceThomas and The Decline of Congress, WASH. PosT, Oct. 11, 1991, at
A-27 ("[Hill deploys] the all-purpose defense of those who do not want to be questioned closely that her
message is being ignored while the messenger is being attacked. On the contrary. Her message has been
received, loud and clear. But since the message is contradicted by Clarence Thomas, by some of his female
associates and by many of Prof. Hill's own actions, the only question is whether this message is true. And since
there were no witnesses, the question of truth hinges on the credibility of the messenger."); Clarence Page,
Clarence Thomas Feeds Blacks' Conspiracy Fears, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 1991, at C-19 ("To me, [Thomas']
prime-time speech indicated a keen awareness of the Rally-Round-the-Brother Syndrome. His calling the
hearings a 'high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who . . . deign to think for themselves' touched all the right
buttons, particularly with black males, who suddenly saw 'Uncle Thomas' replaced by a proud brother under
fire from white folks").
90. See generally HAKI R. MADHUBUTI, BLACK MEN: OBSOLETE, SINGLE, DANGEROUS? THE AFRIKAN
AMERICAN FAMILIES IN TRANSITION: ESSAYS IN DISCOVERY, SOLUTION AND HOPE (1990); YOUNG, BLACK,
AND MALE IN AMERICA: AN ENDANGERED SPECIES (Jewelle T. Gibbs ed., 1988); Salim Muwakkil, Are Black

Males an EndangeredSpecies?, UTNE READER, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 46; Robert Staples, Black Male Genocide:
A Final Solution to the Race Problem in America, in BLACK MALE ADOLESCENTS: PARENTING AND
EDUCATION INCOMMUNITY CONTEXT (Benjamin P. Bowser ed., 1991).
91. The Million Man March on October 16, 1995, brought hundreds of thousands of African American men
to Washington, D.C., for a rally promoting self-empowerment, self-sufficiency, reconciliation, and
responsibility on the part of Black males, and highlighted social, economic, and political issues facing the

Black community. See Maulana Karenga, The Million Man March/Day of Absence Mission Statement, 25
BLACK SCHOLAR 2 (1995); Michael 0. West, Like a River: The Million Man March and the Black Nationalist
Tradition in the United States, 12 J. HIST. SoC. 81 (1999); FarrakhanRevels in the Spotlight of Million Man
March, CNN (October 16, 1995), http://www.cnn.com/US/9510/megamarch/10-16/update/index.html. The

March generated opposition from Black feminists, however, for its marginalization of Black women's issues
and its conception of Black women's roles in the March itself. See Don Terry, Black March Stirs Passionand
Protests: Farrakhan'sCall to Men Upsets Some Black Groups and Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, (noting
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principal site of racial subordination, and thus directs policy, advocacy, and intervention
to addressing the constituent elements of this crisis. Currently, foundations, agencies, and
organizations have sponsored a wide variety of programs, policies, and initiatives
targeted to alleviate racial disparities that effect Black men.92 Attention to Black women
is considerably muted within these discourses; women sometimes appear as the Blacks
most preferred and whose "success" is further evidence of Black male endangerment. 93
At other times Black women function as causal agents to the plight of Black men, 94
blamed for the pending extinction of Black men by dint of their failures to parent,
partner, or role-model in effective ways. 95 Black women are collateral subjects whose
situation is seen in relation to Black men. 96 Consequently, the particular ways in which
the racial subordination that shapes the life chances of women is manifested largely

that Black women had been told not to participate in the March); Frontline:The Two Nations ofBlack America,
Interview with Angela Davis (PBS television broadcast Feb. 10, 1998) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/race/interviews/davis.html) (stating that the March had
suffered from the "failure to integrate gender into the vision of what the Black community needed" and "the
exclusion of women from the march ... although finally . .. someone said it's OK for black women to come,
they don't have to stay at home with the babies as they were urged to before."); see WHITE, supra note 76 and
accompanying text.; Andrea L. Mays, Women's Reactions Run from Elation to Disdain, USA TODAY (Feb. 16,
1996), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/nman013.htm (citing Kimberld Crenshaw as saying,
"No one seems to notice that the gender exclusion is just as much of a problem as what everybody in the march
wanted to talk about, which is racism . .. . A unity that is purchased through the exclusion of the interests of
specific obstacles facing 50% of the community is ill begotten unity." (citations omitted)); Harris, supra note
112, at 108 (citing bell hooks: "Both O.J.'s case and the Million Man March confirm that, while white men are
trying to be sensitive and pretending they're the new man, black men are saying that patriarchy must be upheld
at all costs, even if women must die." (citations omitted)). For further analysis of the patriarchal impulses that
served as the impetus behind the March, see Nikol G. Alexander-Floyd, "We Shall Have Our Manhood":Black
Macho, Black Nationalism, and the Million Man March, 3 MERIDIANS 171, 194-96 (2003) (describing as
problematic the March's gender politics and its underlying assumptions that Black women were not as affected
by racism as Black men, and criticizing the view that Black women have contributed to the oppression of Black
males by usurping their places at the head of the household, thus forcing Black males into a position where
they need to "reclaim" their masculinity).
92. For examples of initiatives, reports, and hearings that have focused on the problems that Black males in
particular face, see JACQUELINE COPELAND-CARSON & THE FORD FOUNDATION, THE MY BROTHER'S KEEPER
FUND: A COLLABORATIVE STRATEGY TO ADDRESS AMERICA'S BLACK MALE CRISIS (2008); IVORY A.

TOLDSON, BREAKING BARRIERS: PLOTTING THE PATH TO ACADEMIC SUCCESS FOR SCHOOL-AGE AFRICAN
AMERICAN MALES (2008); NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 2007: PORTRAIT OF
THE BLACK MALE (Stephanie J. Jones ed., 2007); The Plight of African American Men in Urban America:
HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. (1991).
92. ROBERT SINGH, THE FARRAKHAN PHENOMENON: RACE, REACTION, AND THE PARANOID STYLE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 116 (1997) (quoting Farrakhan as stating that: "[A]s Black men we've been castrated. We
feel so threatened by the high degree of intelligence, aggressiveness, and forthrightness of our women. It only
shows that we have not been afforded the opportunity under this social, economic, and political system to grow
to our full potential as men. Our women have had a little more freedom to grow.").
94. Jawanzaa Kunjufu, in explaining what he perceived as a "conspiracy" against Black males, pinpointed
Black women as one of the forces within a larger society that undermined black men. JAWANZAA KUNJUFU, 2
COUNTERING THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY BLACK BoYs (1985).
95. Ron Harris, NAACP Seeks Solutions to Crisis of Black Males, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1990, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-10/news/mn-80 1_black-male.
96. For example, in a 1994 speech on domestic violence to a largely female audience, Nation of Islam
Minister Louis Farrakhan, the organizer and director of the Million Man March, stated: "Look at all these
young women going to college. When you [referring to black women] come out with your degree, [the black
man] is already behind. The only thing he has is his physical strength and his sex. . . . To have power, the white
male broke the black male. Once your male is broken, [black women] are fair game for being the victim."
FarrakhanDescribes Cycle ofDomestic Violence, WASH. POST, June 27, 1994, at A22. While Farrakhan does
not deny that black women have been subordinated, he explicitly ties their oppression to that of black men, and
suggests that black men have suffered to a greater degree.

2010

CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF THREE KINDS

187

exists outside the current frames. The differences in their experiences are seen not only
as differences in degree (lesser than), but so qualitatively different from men and boys
that the consequences of their marginality in the "crisis" discourses rarely warrants
comment or criticism.
The difference I am attempting to draw here is between the historic mobilizations
against segregation and white supremacy on one hand, and the contemporary frames
built around the notion of Black male endangerment on the other. The former might be
subject to essentialist critique given the group-based logic of the movement's basic
premises, but the fact that there was variability among and between Blacks did not
By contrast, a
undermine the coherence or commensurability of the discourse.
prevailing frame around the contemporary crisis facing the African American
community is explicitly centered on African American men as the subject of racial
trauma. The exclusionary consequence of this frame is not merely rhetorical; it is
material and political. 97 While such a male-centered discourse might be subject to
essentialist critique, a plausible expectation given the readily articulable critique of
feminist accounts that implicitly ground the project in white women's interest, so far,
essentialist criticism of Black male endangerment has yet to emerge.
In the Intersectionalities seminar, we grapple with what might be seen as the
puzzling picture of a yawning asymmetry between the targets of anti-essentialism. We
use this comparison to grapple with precisely what is at stake in the claims, particularly
in relation to "identity" group politics. My own sense in this debate is that projects such
as the Civil Rights Movement on one hand and the Black male endangerment frame on
the other, represent two opposing poles in the essentialist debate. Both seem to survive
essentialist critique - and most students seem to agree that they should. The challenge
then is how then to rethink MacKinnon's project on the one hand, and the contemporary
frame of Black male endangerment on the other. For some students the endangerment
frame survives their critiques of MacKinnon, an argument that seems to illustrate the
curious asymmetry the undergirds the inquiry. Occasionally there are others who share
an essentialist critique of the male-centric antiracism, but extend that critique to
MacKinnon. My own sense that MacKinnon's project is more in line with the Civil
Rights example and that the contemporary crisis frame is not only essentialist but
patriarchal is seldom the winning argument.
Returning to this Article's key inquiry - the asymmetries in anti-essentialist
criticism of feminism and anti-racism - these different orientations toward today's
"crisis" metaphor, might provide additional insight toward understanding why
MacKinnon's What is a White Woman Anyway? struck such disturbingly discordant
notes with many of my students, particularly the Black ones. Black men are, of course,
not alone in the lynching narrative; white women, as MacKinnon noted, play a decisive

97. See for example, Mayor Bloomberg's initiative to address the problem. Press Release, Office of the Mayor,
New York City, Mayor Bloomberg Launches Nation's Most Comprehensive Effort to Tackle Disparities
Young Black and Latino Males and Their Peers (Aug. 4, 2011), available
Between
at http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2flc7Olc789a0/index.jsp?pagelD-m
ayorpress release&catlD-ll 94&docname--http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2
01 lb%2Fpr282-1 1.html&cc=unusedl978&rc= 1194&ndi=l.
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role as the finger-pointing provocateur in an act of violence, a role that is all the more
despicable where the claims of sexual assault were either non-existent or in truth,
voluntary encounters. It is certainly true that the patriarchal dimensions of white
supremacy encouraged and coerced white women into denying interracial desire and
correspondingly, flattened them into the cause de raison for lynching. This flattening in
turn reified white women into an enduring figure of racial threat rather than a reliable
ally in a politics built around gender solidarity. This flattening is partly what is being
challenged by MacKinnon's parade of white female representations. Certainly there are
essentialisms at work here that could well stand interrogation. However, there will be
relatively little "movement" on how white women are configured as characters in this
narrative until there is critical reflection on the gender-work that the lynching narratives
do within antiracist politics, both historically and in contemporary terms. Indeed, so
long as Black women remain locked in the status of mere collateral damage, the
likelihood that any other gender disruption would gain traction is slim. MacKinnon's
efforts in What is a White Woman Anyway? - in particular her extended riff on the
various tropes of white women that underscore the perceived incommensurability of the
social category "women" - were unlikely to penetrate the deep associations between
antiracism and lynching in order to deliver the critical reflection on how white women
were themselves being essentialized.98 Although quite far from her primary aim, in
interrogating the trope of the venile, politically useless, finger pointing white woman,
MacKinnon's prose was read as an attack on the essential representation of anti-Black
racism, one that even the most stalwart Black feminists step to gingerly, and even then
with caveats to signal an unwavering commitment toward the imperative of antiracism.
To the degree that the lynching narrative remains foundational to Black
conceptions of common vulnerability, the collateral effort to disrupt the essentialist
entrapment of one of its central characters is likely to be interpreted as hostile to the

98. MacKinnon here writes:
In this connection, it has recently come to my attention that the white woman is the issue
here, so I decided I better find out what one is. This creature is not poor, not battered, not
raped (not really), not molested as a child, not pregnant as a teenager, not prostituted, not
coerced into pornography, not a welfare mother, and not economically exploited. She
doesn't work. She is either the white man's image of her-effete, pampered, privileged,
protected, flighty, and self-indulgent-or the Black man's image of her-all that, plus
the "pretty white girl" (meaning ugly as sin but regarded as the ultimate in beauty
because she is white). She is Miss Anne of the kitchen, she puts Frederick Douglass to
the lash, she cries rape when Emmet Till looks at her sideways, she manipulates white
men's very real power with the lifting of her very well-manicured little finger. She
makes an appearance in Baraka's "rape the white girl," as Cleaver's real thing after
target practice on Black women, as Helmut Newton's glossy upscale hard-edged,
distanced vamp, and as the Central Park Jogger, the classy white madonna who got
herself raped and beaten nearly to death. She flings her hair, feels beautiful all the time,
complains about the colored help, tips badly, can't do anything, doesn't do anything,
doesn't know anything, and alternates fantasizing about fucking Black men with
accusing them of raping her. As Ntozake Shange points out, all Western civilization
depends on her. On top of all this, out of impudence, imitativeness, pique, and a simple
lack of anything meaningful to do, she thinks she needs to be liberated. Her feminist
incarnation is all of the above, and guilty about every single bit of it, having by dint of
repetition refined saying "I'm sorry" to a high form of art. She can't even make up her
own songs.
MacKinnon, supranote 2, at 18-19 (citations omitted).
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antiracism project. The fact that it is theoretically possible to critique a frame as
essentialist doesn't deliver with it any particular traction or discursive pay off. The
considerable heat generated by this debate seems to be at least as much about
conventional practices of representation, about who and what can be disrupted and what
essentialisms are taken for granted, than it is about a general, replicable and widely
practiced commitment to anti-essentialism. Rather than understanding MacKinnon's
provocative passage and the heat it generated as a primary scene in the war of
essentialisms, one might consider this rhetoric as having come up against a discursive
roadblock, one constituted by the convergence of an antiracism whose patriarchal
subtexts have yet to be disrupted, and a feminist discourse that has yet to fully emerge
from the historical associations of its presumed subjects. This, in the end, adds greater
credence to the notion that at least this particular debate about essentialism is essentially
about permissible disruptions and acceptable elisions, about who can "represent" and
who cannot. One might frame these as largely political questions in that they reflect the
power to ground and define the interests of the group, and not, principally speaking,
about essentialist theory - whether it be feminist, antiracist, post-modem, or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
MacKinnon's work generally and What is a White Woman, Anyway? specifically
help to focus attention on the essentialist paradigms that underwrite a significant portion
of contemporary discourses on feminism as well as antiracism, especially those grounded
in the particularized narrative of Black male endangerment. The comparison of the
critiques of feminist essentialism on one hand, and the relatively muted critiques of
male-centric views of antiracism on the other, call for a more robust analysis of the
rhetorical practices of feminism and antiracism alike. Both projects should be subject to
the same expectations, whether framed as non-essentialist or grounded in the lived
conditions of those whose lives are circumscribed by both race and gender.

